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A Formal Adversary Capability Model for SCADA Environments

  • Thomas Richard McEvoy
  • Stephen D. Wolthusen
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6712)

Abstract

Conventional adversary models used in the analysis of cryptographic protocols such as the Dolev-Yao model and variants rely on a simple communication model in which an adversary fully participates in network communication. In the case of control (supervisory control and data acquisition, SCADA) systems, this set of assumptions can lead to undesirable results as constraints on communication affect both defender and adversary capabilities. These include a restricted topology for message passing and real-time processing constraints resulting in message prioritisation. We therefore propose an alternative adversary model explicitly capturing these constraints. We use a π-calculus variant to reason about priorities and constraints on messages (names) and explicitly model multiple adversarial agents rather than a single omnipotent adversary so as to capture synchronisation and communication effects. As an example of the model’s capabilities, we derive targets for intrusion detection based on constraints on adversary action resulting from adversary-agent communication capabilities.

Keywords

Intrusion Detection Security Property Supervisory Control Covert Channel SCADA System 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas Richard McEvoy
    • 2
  • Stephen D. Wolthusen
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Norwegian Information Security Laboratory, Department of Computer ScienceGjøvik University CollegeNorway
  2. 2.Information Security Group, Department of MathematicsRoyal Holloway, University of LondonUK

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