Abstract
The telecommunications market is one of the most fascinating witnesses of technological progress. Three decades ago “telecommunications” would refer almost exclusively to fixed-line telephony. And international, let alone intercontinental calls were exotic, mainly due to their high prices.
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- 1.
See Fransman (2003) for more on the evolution of the telecommunications industry.
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Servatius, P. (2012). Motivation and Nontechnical Overview. In: Network Economics and the Allocation of Savings. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 653. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21096-9_1
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