Abstract
After having studied the economic problem of tourism firms (Chaps. 8 and 9) as well as their strategic choice in terms of product differentiation, mechanisms of signaling, reputation, advertising, etc. (Chap. 10), in this chapter we will address a number of issues arising from the transactions between firms operating in different markets. In fact, the existence of uncertainty about the future, information asymmetry, and the subsequent opportunistic behavior, the specific features of investment projects, all require the arrangement of tailor-made contracts between firms aimed at bringing back efficiency in the transaction.
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- 1.
The complete contract usually refers to an outside structure, the organizational and legal institutions, to regulate the cases of non-compliance by a party or any other special situations that may occur. Such an external reference can either be implicit or explicitly specified in the contract.
- 2.
The buyer (seller) can exert the right to buy (sell) or not at a specific date in the so-called European call (put) option or within a deadline in the so-called American call (put) option.
- 3.
In case of delivering low-quality services, the profit for the destination would be zero (which is better than −500) if the tour operator delivers low-quality services and 1,500 (which is better than 1,000) if the tour operator delivers high-quality services.
References
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Candela, G., Figini, P. (2012). The Contracts in the Tourism Markets. In: The Economics of Tourism Destinations. Springer Texts in Business and Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20874-4_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20874-4_11
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