Abstract
Roughly speaking, an encryption scheme is said to be non-malleable, if no adversary can modify a ciphertext so that the resulting message is meaningfully related to the original message. We compare this notion of security to secrecy and authenticity, and provide a complete characterization of their relative strengths. In particular, we show that information-theoretic perfect non-malleability is equivalent to perfect secrecy of two different messages. This implies that for n-bit messages a shared secret key of length roughly 2n is necessary to achieve non-malleability, which meets the previously known upper bound. We define approximate non-malleability by relaxing the security conditions and only requiring non-malleability to hold with high probability (over the choice of secret key), and show that any authentication scheme implies approximate non-malleability. Since authentication is possible with a shared secret key of length roughly logn, the same applies to approximate non-malleability.
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Kawachi, A., Portmann, C., Tanaka, K. (2011). Characterization of the Relations between Information-Theoretic Non-malleability, Secrecy, and Authenticity. In: Fehr, S. (eds) Information Theoretic Security. ICITS 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6673. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20728-0_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20728-0_2
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