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Frequency Dependence Arguments for the Co-evolution of Genes and Culture

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Evolution 2.0

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Abstract

The Baldwin effect is a process by which learnt traits become integrated into the genome through a non-Lamarckian mechanism. It has been hypothesized that behaviours characterized by positive frequency dependence – namely, behaviours whose fitness increases with the proportion of individuals in the population adopting it – offer fertile grounds for Baldwinization. We argue that positive complementarities, like the ones exhibited by this type of behaviour, are neither necessary nor sufficient for the Baldwin effect to occur. We offer a taxonomy of frequency dependent interactions to assess the relative likelihood of Baldwinization.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The Baldwin effect is not limited to behavioral traits as opposed to physiological traits. Environmentally-induced physiological adaptations also count as an instance of Baldwinization.

  2. 2.

    Note that mutations are not strictly necessary. Hidden variations may suffice for assimilation.

  3. 3.

    Hinton and Nowlan [18] develop a computational model that explores the interplay between the benefits and costs of learning and the impact of these variables upon adaptive evolution.

  4. 4.

    This example is analyzed in Papineau [19].

  5. 5.

    For simplicity, we deal with pairwise interactions instead of the more realistic set-up in which phenotypes play the field. But our argument about evolutionary stability holds in any case.

  6. 6.

    The payoffs to adoption and non-adoption assume that the new technology to open coconuts allows adopters to eat more than non-adopters per unit of time and that this larger intake enhances their reproductive survival.

  7. 7.

    Adaptive dynamics are dynamics by which strategies whose fitness is higher than the average fitness of the population, grow.

  8. 8.

    Signaling games, pioneered by Lewis [23] to analyze conventions and the emergence of meaning, and the adoption of a technology standard are also coordination games. See Skyrms [24, 25] for an extensive treatment.

  9. 9.

    As stated above, the rules guiding the interaction of the individuals, most prominently the type of spatial interaction, will also affect the evolutionary dynamics of those games.

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Kuechle, G., Rios, D. (2012). Frequency Dependence Arguments for the Co-evolution of Genes and Culture. In: Brinkworth, M., Weinert, F. (eds) Evolution 2.0. The Frontiers Collection. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20496-8_15

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