Abstract
Firms’ conjectures about demand are consequential in oligopoly games. Through agent-based modeling of consumers’ search for products, we can study the rationing of demand between capacity-constrained firms offering homogeneous products and explore the robustness of analytically solvable models’ results. After algorithmically formalizing short-run search behavior rather than assuming a long-run average, this study predicts stronger competition in a two-stage capacity-price game.
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Ruebeck, C.S. (2011). Consumer Search, Rationing Rules, and the Consequence for Competition. In: Salerno, J., Yang, S.J., Nau, D., Chai, SK. (eds) Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling and Prediction. SBP 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6589. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19656-0_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19656-0_24
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