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International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography

SAC 2010: Selected Areas in Cryptography pp 74–91Cite as

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Discovery and Exploitation of New Biases in RC4

Discovery and Exploitation of New Biases in RC4

  • Pouyan Sepehrdad19,
  • Serge Vaudenay19 &
  • Martin Vuagnoux19 
  • Conference paper
  • 1883 Accesses

  • 34 Citations

  • 3 Altmetric

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNSC,volume 6544)

Abstract

In this paper, we present several weaknesses in the stream cipher RC4. First, we present a technique to automatically reveal linear correlations in the PRGA of RC4. With this method, 48 new exploitable correlations have been discovered. Then we bind these new biases in the PRGA with known KSA weaknesses to provide practical key recovery attacks. Henceforth, we apply a similar technique on RC4 as a black box, i.e. the secret key words as input and the keystream words as output. Our objective is to exhaustively find linear correlations between these elements. Thanks to this technique, 9 new exploitable correlations have been revealed. Finally, we exploit these weaknesses on RC4 to some practical examples, such as the WEP protocol. We show that these correlations lead to a key recovery attack on WEP with only 9800 encrypted packets (less than 20 seconds), instead of 24200 for the best previous attack.

Keywords

  • Discrete Fourier Transform
  • Exhaustive Search
  • Success Probability
  • Initialization Vector
  • Stream Cipher

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. EPFL, CH–1015, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Pouyan Sepehrdad, Serge Vaudenay & Martin Vuagnoux

Authors
  1. Pouyan Sepehrdad
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  2. Serge Vaudenay
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  3. Martin Vuagnoux
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg

    Alex Biryukov

  2. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

    Guang Gong

  3. David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo, N2L 3G1, Waterloo, ON, Canada

    Douglas R. Stinson

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Sepehrdad, P., Vaudenay, S., Vuagnoux, M. (2011). Discovery and Exploitation of New Biases in RC4. In: Biryukov, A., Gong, G., Stinson, D.R. (eds) Selected Areas in Cryptography. SAC 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6544. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19574-7_5

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