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The European Union after Lisbon pp 47–70Cite as

The Union’s Legal Personality Ideas and Questions Lying Behind the Concept

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Abstract

Responding to a toast delivered at the Harvard Commencement in 1884, Supreme Court Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes stated: Behind every scheme to make the world over, lies the question: what kind of world do we want.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Scelle (1933), p. 345 (excerpt of Scelle’s concept of a “monisme intersocial”).

  2. 2.

    The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes – His Speeches, Essays, Letters, and Judicial Opinions, selected and edited, with a new preface and afterword by Max Lerner, New Brunswick (USA) and Oxford (UK) 1989, p. 20.

  3. 3.

    See Seidl-Hohenveldern (1998), pp. 3 et seq. An overview over the vast jurisdiction offers Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Casebook Völkerrecht, München 2005, in footnotes 278, 279 and 281.

  4. 4.

    Bindschedler (1995), p. 1299.

  5. 5.

    Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949), ICJ Reports 1949, p. 180: “Whereas a State possesses the totality of international rights and duties recognized by international law, the rights and duties of an entity such as the Organisation must depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice.” Furthermore, with regard to the objectives and tasks of the United Nations, the ICJ stated: “The functions of the Organisation are of such a character that they could not be effectively discharged if they involved the concurrent action, on the international plane, of fifty-eight or more Foreign Offices, and the Court concludes that the Members have endowed the Organisation with capacity to bring international claims when necessitated by the discharge of its functions.”

  6. 6.

    For the situation of the European Community see Ginther (1994), pp. 335 et seqq. (“culpa levissima” is enough); Oppermann et al. (2009), para. 15, notes 2 et seqq.

  7. 7.

    See for instance Case C-327/91 France v Commission (ECJ 9 August 1994); Hirsch (1995), p. 10, note 50.

  8. 8.

    The so-called pacta tertiis-rule; cf. Art. 34 (et seqq.) VCLT. This rule represents, additionally, a general principle of international law.

  9. 9.

    It is not the aim to offset, at this place, the contradiction of the so-called will theory. The contradiction lies in the fact that if, as generally held, rules of law are binding only upon those who subscribe to them (“Lotus principle”), it follows that a mere agreement between Member States of an organisation to create a legal person does not suffice to endow the organisation with personality towards non-Member States. Therefore, what is needed is acceptance of the existence of the organisation by third parties, which is often captured in the word “recognition”. This leads, however, to a paradox: If the will of the founders is decisive, then recognition cannot enter the picture; if recognition is required, it follows that the will of the founders is not, as such, decisive. The obvious solution then would be to strip the element of recognition from the theory, but that leaves the “will theory” vulnerable to isolation: What happens if its founders endow an organisation with personality and yet no one wants to engage with it? In that case, the will of the founders would be all the more illusory. Cf. on this Barberis (1983), pp. 145–285, esp. p. 169.

  10. 10.

    See for example Herdegen (2008), para. 5, note 8; Craig and de Búrca (2008), p. 171; Jaag (2003a), note 1206; Streinz (2008), notes 675 and 676.

  11. 11.

    Their wording is even identical. Of course, it is important to note in this context that both treaties have been signed at the same date, namely on 25 March 1957, while the ECSC Treaty dated from 18 April 1951 (see footnote 12).

  12. 12.

    “(1) The Community shall have legal personality. (2) In international relations, the Community shall enjoy the legal capacity it requires to perform its functions and attain its objectives. (3) In each of the Member States, the Community shall enjoy the most extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons constituted in that State: it may, in particular, acquire or dispose of movable and immovable property and may be a party to legal proceedings. (4) The Community shall be represented by its institutions, each within the limits of its powers.”

  13. 13.

    See for Art. 282 EC the commentary of Armin Hatje in von der Groeben and Schwarze (2003), especially notes 28 et seqq.

  14. 14.

    Cf. Arts. 131–134 and 177–181a EC.

  15. 15.

    Case 22/70 Commission v Council (ECJ 31 March 1971); on this, see also Dashwood and Hliskoski (2000), notes 1.03 et seqq.

  16. 16.

    The ERTA/AETR judgment has been reaffirmed by a number of other decisions of the Court, such as the judgments in joined cases 3/76, 4/76, 6/76 Kramer et al. (ECJ 14 July 1976) paras 19–20 as well as in the findings in Opinion 1/76, European Laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels (ECJ 26 April 1977) para 3, Opinion 2/91 ILO Convention on safety in the use of chemicals at work (ECJ 19 March 1993) para 7, Opinion 2/92 Third Revised Decision of the OECD on National Treatment (ECJ 24 March 1995) para 29 and Opinion 1/94 WTO-GATS and TRIPS (ECJ 28 March 1996) para 48.

  17. 17.

    Case 22/70 Commission v Council (ECJ 31 March 1971) para 14.

  18. 18.

    Case 22/70 Commission v Council (ECJ 31 March 1971) paras 16–19.

  19. 19.

    Cf. Dashwood (2000), supra footnote 15, notes 8.01 et seqq.

  20. 20.

    For another interesting analysis see Weiler (1981), pp. 269 et seq. Joseph H.H. Weiler compares the supranational integration to a balance between political and legal processes.

  21. 21.

    See for the characteristics of the pillar structure Everling (1992), pp. 1053–1077; Wellenstein (1992), pp. 205–212; Curtin and Heukels (1994).

  22. 22.

    See Hilf (1982), pp. 361 et seqq.

  23. 23.

    See e.g. Hilf (1994), pp. 75 et seqq.; as well as Stumpf (2009), Art. 1 EUV, notes 4 et seqq.

  24. 24.

    Everling (1992), p. 1061; Pliakos (1993), p. 213; Eaton (1994), p. 221; Heukels and de Zwaan (1994), pp. 201, 202 et seq. as well as 227.

  25. 25.

    Cloos et al. (1994), p. 115. There, it is said: “L’Union, dans cette approche, est un concept politique bien plus que juridique, et elle ne dispose dès lors pas de la personnalité juridique. On n’est pas arrivé au stade où les Etats membres seraient prêts à transférer leurs compétences en matière de politique étrangère à une entité juridique distincte. Ils sont d’accord pour agir collectivement sur la scène internationale, mais non pas pour disparaître en tant qu’acteurs juridiquement distincts.”

  26. 26.

    See for instance von Bogdandy and Nettesheim (1986), pp. 2 et seqq.; Seidl-Hohenveldern and Loibl (2000), note 0119e; von Bogdandy (1998), pp. 165 et seqq.; Zuleeg (2003), p. 931; Kaddous (2008a), p. 299 (with further reference).

  27. 27.

    Klabbers (1998), pp. 243 et seq. (Jan Klabbers remains nevertheless sceptical; see his remarks on p. 233).

  28. 28.

    For a short but perspective overview of the various contending theories see Kuyper (1979), pp. 3–41, especially pp. 15–19.

  29. 29.

    Commission Decision No. 93/591/EC concerning the name to be given to the Council following the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, O.J. L 281/18 (1993). Then again, the Commission and the Court of Justice were still designated as “of the European Communities”. On the contrary, the official name of the European Parliament contained no reference to either the Communities or the Union.

  30. 30.

    In a similar context, reference can be made to the “Citizenship of the Union”, a capacity for persons holding the nationality of a Member State, elaborated in Arts. 17–22 EC.

  31. 31.

    See the former Art. 237 EC.

  32. 32.

    See the brief overview of the EU framework by Zuleeg (2003) (supra footnote 26), p. 931.

  33. 33.

    See Dashwood (1998), pp. 1019–1045; Curtin and Dekker (1999), pp. 83–136.

  34. 34.

    A strengthening of the Community cooperation results, for example, from the conferral of new competences to the Community, e.g. in the area of employment policy (Arts. 125–130 EC) and social policy (Arts. 136–145 EC).

  35. 35.

    See for instance Schroeder (2003), pp. 382 et seqq.

  36. 36.

    See the documentation of Busse (1999), pp. 46 et seqq. and the proposals of the Irish resp. Dutch Presidency, CONF/2500/96 of 5 December 1996, pp. 91 et seqq. resp. CONF/2500/9, ADD.1 of 20 March 1997, p. 47.

  37. 37.

    See the relevant paragraph in the final report of the Reflection Group of December 1995: “A majority of member points to the advantage of international legal personality for the Union so that it can conclude international agreements on the subject-matter of Titles V and VI concerning the CFSP and the external dimension of justice and home affairs. For them, the fact that the Union does not legally exist is a source of confusion outside and diminishes its external role. Others consider that the creation of international legal personality for the Union could risk confusion with the legal prerogatives of Member States.” Reflection Group Report and Other References for Documentary Purposes, 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Brussels 1996, para 150 (on p. 76) (italics ours).

  38. 38.

    For a more detailed, however different, analysis see von Bogdandy (1999), pp. 887–910.

  39. 39.

    See Weidenfeld (2002); Andena and Usher (2003).

  40. 40.

    See Streinz (2008), notes 53 et seqq. (with further reference); furthermore Matthias Pechstein in: Rudolf Streinz (ed.), EUV/EGV, Munich 2003, Art. 1 EUV notes 10 et seqq.; Stumpf (2009), Art. 1 EUV notes 4 et seqq., especially the overview on the doctrine in note 9.

  41. 41.

    1984: Draft Treaty founding the European Union, 14 February 1984 (Spinelli Report); Council Resolution of 28 February 1994 on the Constitution of the European Union, O.J. C 61/155; on the development in general, see Bieber et al. (2009), Sect. 1.C.

  42. 42.

    See Jaag (2003b), pp. 104 et seqq.

  43. 43.

    The dignity attributed to the assembly of the Founding Fathers becomes apparent in the story which is told that the streets and squares of Philadelphia around the Convention venue, “Liberty Hall”, were covered in sawdust so that delegates would not have their deliberations disrupted by the rattling of passing carriages.

  44. 44.

    Arts. I-22 and I-28 TCE.

  45. 45.

    Le Monde, Dossiers et Documents, July 2003: “Cette future constitution va être une grande étape dans l’histoire de la construction européenne.”

  46. 46.

    Economist, 5 July 2003, p. 34.

  47. 47.

    For a brief analysis see Thürer (2005), p. 13; and farther “From the constitution to a new round of treaty: step-by-step” (editorial comments) (2007), pp. 1229 et seqq.

  48. 48.

    With 448 articles and nine protocols, the Constitution had become too bulky. The length of the text may be explained by the fact that the Convention did not limit its work to a constitutional basic law, the general part of any constitutional treaty, but also wanted to carry out itself the required adaptations to the existing treaties – in the various policy areas of the EU. Moreover, the EUCFR was included in its entirety in the treaty; cf. Schwarze (2003), pp. 535, 536 et seqq.

  49. 49.

    Council of the European Union, 11177/1/07 REV 1, Brussels, 20 July 2007.

  50. 50.

    See Schwarze et al. (2009).

  51. 51.

    Preamble of the Treaty.

  52. 52.

    See Art. 18. In fact, the provisions concerning the CFSP of the Lisbon Treaty remain practically the same as those under the Constitutional Treaty. The change, resulting from the fact that the “Union’s Minister for Foreign Affairs” is renamed “High Representative” is purely symbolic in the sense that it intends to dispel the fears related to the terms evoking the image of a “constitution” or of a “State”. Apart from the change in the title of the High Representative, two new declarations on CFSP clarify that no new powers are conferred to the European institutions in that matter. Cf. on the High Representative Kaddous (2008b), pp. 205–221, especially pp. 207 et seqq.

  53. 53.

    Art. 1.3 sentence 3 TEU.

  54. 54.

    Art. 47 TEU.

  55. 55.

    See Goldsmith (2008), pp. 929 et seqq. and in this context further Frowein (2004), pp. 421 et seqq.

  56. 56.

    On this see Thürer (2006), pp. 52 et seqq. Nonetheless, reasoning of this kind is not profound enough for a federal/confederal dichotomy. Cf. on this Peters (2001); von Bogdandy (2003), with contributions by Jürgen Bast, Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann, Jürgen Drexl, Christoph Grabenwarter, Ulrich Haltern, Armin Hatje, Stefan Kadelbach, Thorsten Kingreen, Paul Kirchhof, Jürgen Kühling, Franz Christian Mayer, Christoph Möllers, Martin Nettesheim, Stefan Oeter, Alexancer Schmitt Glaeser, Werner Schroeder, Robert Uerpmann, Antje Wiener, Jan Wouters and Manfred Zuleeg.

  57. 57.

    Compare Scelle (1943), p. 23: “la technique du Droit international se modèle, le plus exactement possible, sur celle de tout autre ordre juridique. On ne saurait considérer l’Etat que comme un groupement d’intérêts éminemment respectable et puissant, mais non comme un sujet de Droit, ni comme un titulaire de droits subjectifs” and p. 19: “L’Etat se présente historiquement comme l’élément politique capital de la société internationale, car tous les individus humains et tous les groupements humains, sont rattachés à des Etats ou plutôt des ordres juridiques étatiques […]. Les Etats ne dépendent pas juridiquement les uns des autres, […]. Mais ils sont dans un état d’interdépendance matérielle, en raison de la solidarité interétatique. Ils dépendent juridiquement de l’ordre juridique international.” In this regard, see also the reference supra, in footnote 1.

  58. 58.

    See Scelle (1956), pp. 324 et seqq., here pp. 329 et seqq.

  59. 59.

    Case 294/83 Les Verts v. Parliament (ECJ 23 April 1986) para 23.

  60. 60.

    Art. 50 TEU.

  61. 61.

    EUFOR is a temporary military deployment, not a permanent military force, coordinated by the High Representative for the CFSP.

  62. 62.

    Arts. 15.5 and 6 TEU.

  63. 63.

    Arts. 18.4 TEU.

  64. 64.

    Especially Arts. 21 et seqq. TEU.

  65. 65.

    On this, see Frowein (2004), pp. 430 et seq.

  66. 66.

    In addition, experience from the area of international and supranational organisations, but also federative constructs based on the law of national states, show us that precisely small units can exert an influence as “mediators” or “brokers”.

  67. 67.

    Cf. Allott (2002), pp. 380 et seqq., coined the expression of “Hof-Mafia”. He wrote: “There were no rules about who could participate in the international court of courts but, as at Versailles or Schönbrunn or Potsdam or St Petersburg, mere presence as part of what we may call the international Hofmafia did not confer any automatic degree of power or influence or even of prestige” (p. 384) and: “The Congress of Vienna was the last great party of the old order dancing on its own grave” (p. 382).

  68. 68.

    Cf. Weil (2002), p. 55: “Rome, like every colonizing country, had morally and spiritually uprooted than conquered countries. Such is always the effect of a colonial conquest. It was not a question of giving them back their roots. It was necessary they should still be a little further uprooted.” Cf. also p. 17 on the link between colonialism and mission: “Missionary zeal has not Christianized Africa, Asia and Oceania, but has brought these territories under the cold, cruel and destructive domination of the white race, which has trodden down everything.”

  69. 69.

    Cf. Singer (2002), particularly pp. 106 et seqq. This principle is, by the way, formally inscribed in the EU Treaty: See the reference to it in Art. 6.1, which holds the general principles for membership of the Union. Moreover, Art. 7 contains the modalities of the procedure to look after the respect, by the Member States, of the principles of Art. 6.1. In this regard, the so-called “Copenhague criterias” of course also have to be mentioned.

  70. 70.

    Cf. the critical view of Nye (2004). See further Thürer (2000), pp. 452 et seqq.

  71. 71.

    See however the remarks of Kaddous (2008b), pp. 219 et seq.

  72. 72.

    Cf. von Bogdandy (2004), pp. 1 et seq.

  73. 73.

    A better example would be – albeit in an attenuated form – the German Federal President rather than the French President.

  74. 74.

    From this perspective it is also to be regretted that Europe’s commitment in the area of active peace policy, in particular in peacekeeping, has diminished.

  75. 75.

    Dahrendorf (2008), p. 43.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Völkerrecht und Ausländisches Verfassungsrecht, Universität Zürich, Rämistrasse 74/36, 8001, Zürich, Switzerland

    Daniel Thürer

  2. Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Luzern, Winkelriedstrasse 14, 7992, 6007, Luzern, Switzerland

    Pierre-Yves Marro

  3. Frohburgstrasse 3, 4466, 6002, Luzern, Switzerland

    Pierre-Yves Marro

Authors
  1. Daniel Thürer
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  2. Pierre-Yves Marro
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Correspondence to Daniel Thürer or Pierre-Yves Marro .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. , Faculty for Economics, Law and Social Sc, University of Erfurt, Nordhäuser Straße 63, Erfurt, 99089, Germany

    Hermann-Josef Blanke

  2. Regionalism, Federalism and Self-Governm, National Research Council - Institute fo, Via dei Taurini 19, Rome, 00185, Italy

    Stelio Mangiameli

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Thürer, D., Marro, PY. (2012). The Union’s Legal Personality Ideas and Questions Lying Behind the Concept. In: Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (eds) The European Union after Lisbon. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19507-5_3

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