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A Correlation Power Analysis Attack against Tate Pairing on FPGA

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 6578))

Abstract

Pairings on elliptic curves are deeply researched and used in applications such as identity based schemes. Recently there have been several hardware implementations of the Tate Pairing. Along with the algorithms, their security has to be considered. This paper presents a correlation power analysis (CPA) attack against a Tate pairing implementation. Real power traces are taken from the FPGA implementation. The experimental result shows a successful attack.

This material is based upon works supported by the Science Foundation Ireland under Grant No. [SFI/ 08/RFP/ENE1643].

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Pan, W., Marnane, W.P. (2011). A Correlation Power Analysis Attack against Tate Pairing on FPGA. In: Koch, A., Krishnamurthy, R., McAllister, J., Woods, R., El-Ghazawi, T. (eds) Reconfigurable Computing: Architectures, Tools and Applications. ARC 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6578. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19475-7_36

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19475-7_36

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-19474-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-19475-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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