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China and Constitutional Monarchy: Four Short Encounters Around 1900

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Structures on the Move

Abstract

For many centuries, China with its deep-rooted and ancient culture was one of the most advanced civilisations on our Earth and usually far ahead of its counterparts on the European continent. As a matter of fact, before the beginning of the Modern Era in about 1500 A.D., only the Roman Empire at its height in the first two centuries A.D. was able to measure up to its Chinese counterpart (then the Eastern Han 東漢 Dynasty, 25–220 A.D.) by virtue of its population (more than 50 million people), territorial extension, military strength, technological level and economic exchange. Although the Eastern Han Dynasty collapsed two centuries earlier than the (Western) Roman Empire whose last Emperor, Romulus Augustulus, was forced to abdicate in 476, China saw the establishment of a series of big, centralised empires—starting with the Jin 晉 Dynasty which lasted from 265 to 420—whereas the European continent remained fragmented (with the exception of the Napoleonic Empire in 1804–1814/15). Also, even though China itself was, during the last two millennia, divided into a series of smaller states many times adding up to several centuries in total, it never faced the same kind of cultural decline as Europe did just after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire. In fact, the periods when China was fragmented into smaller states became shorter with time, whereas the times when it was unified under a central government became longer. Also, the area of the empires ruling China had the tendency to grow larger after each reunification. Huge increases in area occurred during the Mongol Yuan 元 Dynasty (1279–1368) and the last dynasty, the Qing 清Dynasty (1636/1644–1912), which was originally founded in Manchuria in 1636.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Today “Manchuria” consists of the three “northeastern” (東北 dongbei) provinces of Heilongjiang 黑龍江, Jilin吉林 and Liaoning 遼寧 as well as the northernmost parts of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (内蒙古自治區 Nei Menggu Zizhiqu).

  2. 2.

    In China, certain products were already being produced on a quasi-industrial scale. In this context, it is interesting to note that, for example, in the eighteenth century the porcelain kilns of Jingdezhen 景德鎮 employed at least 100,000 people, cf. Seitz (2000: 80). However, Friedrich Reichel advances an estimated figure of “one million people, that earned their living [in 1720] in a direct or indirect way from the fabrication of porcelain”, cf. Reichel (1993: 12). However, the manufacture of products on a pre-industrial level in China is not restricted to the era of the Qing 清 Dynasty; as a matter of fact, already in 1100 A.D. during the Song 宋 Dynasty (960–1279), China’s steel foundries produced annually about 150,000 metric tons of iron and steel, a figure which in Europe was not achieved before the eighteenth century, cf. Cerutti (1986: 15).

  3. 3.

    This is especially true for the porcelain produced for the Imperial court at the kilns of Jingdezhen 景德鎮 in present-day Jiangxi 江西 province or for the dragon robes and other silk products produced in the Jiangnan 江南 region.

  4. 4.

    For more information regarding social mobility by way of passing imperial examinations (Chinese: keju 科舉), cf. Ho 何 (1962: especially 87), where Ho 何 mentions a number of Chinese from the most modest backgrounds who managed to pass imperial examinations and thus raise their social status considerably.

  5. 5.

    A similar, fateful development was to occur on the African continent in the second half of the twentieth century: according to Meredith (2006: 289ff.), “from a little over 200 million in 1960, the population by 1990 had reached 450 million. […] The rate of population growth added to pressures on agricultural production, on urban growth and on government spending.”

  6. 6.

    According to Hibbert (1989: 152), there were about two million opium addicts in China in the year 1835.

  7. 7.

    According to Flessel (1988: 111), starting in 1834, China each year had to use 2,000 t of its silver reserves in order to pay for opium, as the earnings from the export of tea and silk proved insufficient to cover the expenses of rising opium imports.

  8. 8.

    The biggest rebellion was the Taiping 太平 Rebellion from 1850 to 1864, which not only resulted in the deaths of nearly 30 million people, but also the large-scale destruction of China’s economic powerhouse region of Jiangnan 江南 (which encompasses the regions on the shores of the Yangzi river 揚子江 of today’s provinces of Anhui 安徽, Jiangsu 江蘇, Jiangxi 江西, Zhejiang 浙江 as well as the Shanghai municipality 上海市). According to Gernet (1989: 469), even 50 years after the end of the Taiping Rebellion the scars of the destruction were still very visible in this region.

  9. 9.

    This applies especially to the kingdoms of the United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, as well as to the Empires of Germany and Japan.

  10. 10.

    In this paper, “republican” is understood as being of “non-monarchic” nature.

  11. 11.

    With hindsight, even in the first half of the twenty-first century, where the most widespread forms of government are various kinds of democracies in republican systems, it is still possible to recognise some of the advantages inherent to a constitutional monarchy: as the example of Belgium illustrates, the fact of having a constitutional monarch from a hereditary royal family at the summit of the state can be very effective in keeping different ethnic groups (in this case French-speaking Walloons, Dutch-speaking Flemish and Germans) together within the same multi-ethnic state. Cf. for example, Israel (2010: 5). For more information on the Kings of the Belgians, cf. Roegiers (2007). Another interesting example of a country that has strongly benefited from a (past) constitutional monarchy is Brazil: as a matter of fact, the Brazilian Empire of 1822–1889 under its able Emperors Pedro I and especially Pedro II played a crucial role in uniting and modernising this huge country and providing it with a national identity. For more information on this Empire as well as its rulers, cf. Kienzl (1942), Barman (1999) and Schwarcz (2004).

  12. 12.

    E.g. according to clause 21, earls and barons should only be judged by their peers.

  13. 13.

    According to Article 4 of Chapter II of the French Constitution, the main function of the French King was to maintain the Constitution and to ensure laws were kept to: “Le roi, à son avènement au trône, ou dès qu’il aura atteint sa majorité, prêtera à la Nation, en présence du Corps législatif, le serment d’être fidèle à la Nation et à la loi, d’employer tout le pouvoir qui lui est délégué, à maintenir la Constitution décrétée par l’Assemblée nationale constituante, aux années 1789, 1790 et 1791, et à faire exécuter les lois.—Si le corps législatif n’est pas assemblé, le roi fera publier une proclamation, dans laquelle seront exprimés ce serment et la promesse de la réitérer aussitôt que le Corps législatif sera réuni.” Perhaps the most patent innovation in relation to the new form of a constitutional monarchy is Article 3 of Chapter II which states that law—and not the monarch—is the highest authority in France: “Il n’y a point en France d’autorité supérieure à celle de la loi. Le roi ne règne que par elle, et ce n’est qu’au nom de la loi qu’il peut exiger l’obéissance.”

  14. 14.

    Actually, the power of the French King had already been “suspended” on 10 August 1792. Cf. Kuhn (2003: 89).

  15. 15.

    The “constitutional” law for the First Empire of France was in fact the “Senatus-consulte organique du 28 floréal an XII”, which was declared on 18 May 1804. The terminology of this basic law takes its inspiration from Republican Rome, cf. Jörs et al. (1987: 15f.)

  16. 16.

    The enhanced position of the French Emperor in comparison to the reduced role of Louis XVI after the proclamation of the first French constitution can be seen both in the absence of an article putting the law above the Emperor and in the absence of a clear-cut separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers in Napoleon’s imperial “constitution”. Indeed, the Emperor of the French could appoint many key people, among them the president of the Senate (Title VIII, Art. 58 Senatus-consulte organique du 28 floréal an XII) and the presidents of the Courts of cassation, appeal and criminal justice (Title XIV, Art. 135). Concerning the Emperor’s authority over judicial matters, see also Art. 1 under Title I of this Senatus-consulte: “Le Gouvernement de la République est confié à un Empereur, qui prend le titre d’Empereur des Français. La justice se rend, au nom de l’Empereur, par les officiers qu’il institue”. Nevertheless, it is possible to recognise the constitutional character of the First Empire in France in the oath the Emperor had to take: “Le serment de l’Empereur est ainsi conçu: ‘Je jure de maintenir l’intégrité du territoire de la République, de respecter et de faire les lois du concordat et la liberté des cultes; de respecter et faire respecter l’égalité des droits, la liberté politique et civile, l’irrévocabilité des ventes des biens nationaux; de ne lever aucun impôt, de n’établir aucune taxe qu’en vertu de la loi; de maintenir l’institution de la Légion d’honneur; de gouverner dans la seule vue de l’intérêt, du bonheur et de la gloire du peuple français.” (Title VII, Art. 53).

  17. 17.

    As the British monarch—currently Queen Elizabeth II—is also the sovereign of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Jamaica, Barbados, the Bahamas, Grenada, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Belize, Antigua and Barbuda as well as Saint Kitts and Nevis, and holds each crown separately but equally shared in a monarchy, this applies, of course, also to all these countries.

  18. 18.

    Cf. Section 3 of chapter I of the Thai Constitution of 26 April 2007: “Sovereign power belongs to the Thai people. The King as head of the state shall exercise such power through the National Legislative Assembly, Council of Ministers, courts, other constitutional organizations and state agencies in accordance with the rule of law.”

  19. 19.

    For a detailed analysis of how Thailand’s King Bhumibol was able to enhance his power incrementally during his long reign, cf. Handley (2006).

  20. 20.

    According to article 100 of the constitution of the Brazilian Empire his title was “Constitutional Emperor and Perpetual Defender of Brazil”. Cf. Schwarcz (2004: 27).

  21. 21.

    The Constitution of the Prussian State was proclaimed on 5 December 1848 and revised on 31 January 1850 and remained in force thereafter until the collapse of the German Empire in 1918. The main focus of the Constitution’s revision in 1850 was to divide the population into three tax-classes. As each tax-class chose one third of the electors, this meant in fact a massive increase in power and influence for the wealthy classes, thus pushing back the democratic element. Cf. article 71 of the revised Prussian Constitution.

  22. 22.

    A reprint of the constitution of the German Empire of 16 April 1871 is to be found in Willoweit and Seif (2003: 589–609).

  23. 23.

    Cf. Sect. 4.2.2.

  24. 24.

    In fact, before the arrival of Commodore Perry’s fleet, there had been several encounters with Western powers, especially with Russia, but also with the United Kingdom and the United States of America. However, until 1853, the Japanese managed to keep every foreign power at a distance. Cf. Hall (1997: 242–244)

  25. 25.

    I.e. to the United States of America, England, France, Russia and the Netherlands; cf. Choi (2011: 97–108).

  26. 26.

    For more information about the Western influence on Japanese laws, cf. Choi (2011: 97–108).

  27. 27.

    France having been defeated by the Prussians in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and the United States of America being somewhat weakened because of the devastations of the War of Secession (1861–1865) might explain to some extent why these two countries did not serve as possible models for the reorganisation of the Japanese form of government.

  28. 28.

    Cf. Montesquieu [1748]: book VIII, chapter XXI, 260f.: “La Chine est donc un État despotique, dont le principe est la crainte. Peut-être que dans les premières dynasties, l’empire n’étant pas si étendu, le gouvernement déclinait un peu de cet esprit. Mais aujourd’hui, cela n’est pas.” Such prejudices against Asian countries and their culture are typical examples of what has been dubbed “Orientalism” since Edward W. Said’s book of the same name. Cf. Said (2003) and Sardar (2002).

  29. 29.

    The idea that China’s rulers ought to reign for the benefit of their people is also called “minben 民本”-thought. Cf. Müller (1997: 43–48). The origin of the term “minben” (which could also be translated as “the people are the fundaments [of society]”) derives from ideas and ideals of Mencius 孟子 (the second most influential Confucian philosopher after Confucius himself), a typical expression of his on this subject being the following: “Mencius said, ‘The people are of supreme importance; the altars of the gods of earth and grain come next; last comes the ruler. That is why he who gains the confidence of the multitudinous people will be Emperor. […]’” cf. Meng Zi 孟子 1979, Mencius, vol. II, book 7, part B, section 14, 290f. (original Chinese text: 孟子曰: 〈〈民爲貴,社稷次之, 君爲輕。是故得乎丘民而爲天子。……〉〉)

  30. 30.

    During the last Imperial dynasty in China, the Qing 清, the edicts of the (founding) Emperors were called “shengxun 聲訊” (“Sage Commands”) whereas the “Collected Institutions” were called “Collected Institutions of the Qing Dynasty” (Chinese: Da Qing huidian 大清會典). According to Simon (2007: footnote 72 on p. 39), when the “Collected Institutions of the Qing Dynasty” were revised the last time, in 1904, they comprised 100 books containing regulations and describing the imperial institutions of the state as well as 1220 volumes full of precedents.

  31. 31.

    A good example of this attitude can be seen in the following expression of Confucius 孔子: “The Master said: ‘Listening to the divergent positions of litigating parties is something I can do as well as anybody else. But what one should really achieve is to let no disputes arise.’” (original Chinese version: 子曰:《聼訟, 吾猶人也。必也是無訟乎!》), for a German translation, cf. Kong Zi 孔子 (1998, chapter XII, part 13, 75).

  32. 32.

    Although there were many other important philosophies in traditional China, e.g. Legism (Fa Jia 法家), Daoism (Dao Jia 道家), Mohism (Mo Jia 墨家) and Buddhism (Fo Jiao 佛教), starting with the Han 漢 Dynasty, Confucianism (Ru Jia 儒家) was the dominant philosophy throughout the greater part of the history of Imperial China. However, as far as law is concerned, the Confucian lawmakers of the Han Dynasty as well as those of succeeding dynasties were heavily inspired by Legism. Cf. Heuser (2002: 93f). For more information concerning these traditional Chinese philosophies (apart from Buddhism which originated in present-day India and Nepal), cf. Mühlemann (2006: 25–59).

  33. 33.

    The Confucian philosophers were realistic enough to know that the fulfilment of this aim was very hard to achieve if not outright utopian.

  34. 34.

    Cf. Lui 呂 (1978, 1f.)—for more information on the Censorate in Imperial China, see also Hucker (1966).

  35. 35.

    For an example of actions by the Censorate based on the “Institutions of the Forebears”—in this case those of the Ming 明 Dynasty (Da Ming huidian 大明會典)—cf. Will (2007: 148–154).

  36. 36.

    Whilst Kang Youwei 康有爲 is well known for his stance in favour of constitutional monarchy, it is interesting to see that according to his utopian vision of the world as described in his posthumously published “Book on the Great Unity” (Da Tong Shu 大同書), his real aim was a worldwide democratic republican system, somewhat similar to the federal government systems of the United States or Switzerland. Cf. Kang 康 (2002: 105) (Chinese text) or Kang 康 (1974: 83f). (German translation). Once this stage had been achieved, there would be no place for ruling monarchies, cf. Kang 康 (2002: 106) (Chinese text) or Kang 康 (1974: 85f.) (German translation).

  37. 37.

    Cf. Kang 康 (1996: 194): 伏乞皇上下詔鼓天下之氣, 遷都定天下之本, 練兵強天下之勢, 變法成天下之治而已。(We implore His Imperial Majesty to proclaim an edict that would mobilise the energies of the Empire, that would move the capital in order to stabilise the foundations of the Empire, that would train the army in order to strengthen the power of the Empire, and, finally, that would complete the reforms of the government of the Empire.)

  38. 38.

    Cf. e.g. Kang (1996: 171): 夫先王之治天下, 與民共之, 《洪範》 之大疑大事, 謀及庶人愛大同。 《孟子》 稱進賢、 殺人 待於國人之皆可。(When the ancient Kings governed the Empire, they did it together with the people. “The Great Rule” said that in case of doubts or important events, the population had to be consulted because the multitudes loved the “Big Unity”. According to “Mencius”, the ruler waited upon knowing the opinion of the population before appointing high officials or pronouncing death sentences.) While Kang 康 did often refer to ancient Confucian sources in order to legitimate reforms, he sometimes went as far as manipulating these texts. In one example he exchanged one character for another that was invented entirely by himself, thus trying to “legitimate” more freedom for women. cf. Senger (2000: 366f.)

  39. 39.

    Among those executed were Kang Youwei’s 康有爲 own brother, Kang Guangren 康廣仁, and the famous thinker Tan Sitong 譚嗣同.

  40. 40.

    According to Klein (2007: 95), without the coup of the conservatives, the Reform movement of 1898 would have “without any doubt” resulted in a constitutional monarchy in China.

  41. 41.

    This nickname was due to the fact that unlike most people in the Republic of China, General Zhang Xun 張勳 (as well as his troops) kept their hair plaited in a pigtail, a sign of allegiance to the defunct Qing 清 Dynasty.

  42. 42.

    Cf. Sect. 4.2.4.

  43. 43.

    Obviously, the Russian people seemed to come to a similar conclusion: in Russia, the sinking of the Czar’s Baltic fleet and the defeat of his land forces in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/5 led to the Russian Revolution of 1905 with its calls for more participation from the people. Under such heavy pressure, Czar Nicholas (Hикoлaй) II agreed to the establishment of a parliament (the Duma Ду́мa) and to the first Russian constitution of 23 April 1906.

  44. 44.

    Cf. Hsü (2000: 412). In this context, the famous scholar and politician Zhang Jian 張謇 exclaimed “triumphantly”: “The victory of Japan and the defeat of Russia are the victory of constitutionalism and the defeat of monarchism” (Hsü 2000: ibid.).

  45. 45.

    As a matter of fact, in the decades preceding there had already been several important Chinese missions abroad, tasked with studying the society and culture of advanced (mostly Western) nations. Here one should especially mention the missions of Zhang Deyi 張德彝 (1847–1919) to America and Europe (particularly France) in the years 1866–1871 as well as the diplomatic tour of Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 (1823–1901)—one of China’s most influential statesmen at the end of the Qing 清 Dynasty—to Russia, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, the United States and Canada. Undertaken just after China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894/95, the principal aim of Li’s 李 mission consisted in forging alliances—especially with Russia—in order to counter Japan’s growing influence in East Asia.

  46. 46.

    For more details, cf. Mühlemann (2006: 155).

  47. 47.

    This edict is translated into English in Meienberger (1980: 42–44).

  48. 48.

    Cf. Meienberger (1980: footnote 8 on 58).

  49. 49.

    Cf. Meienberger (1980: footnote 8 on p. 58) and Klein (2007: 95). Because the Chinese decided on a written constitution, they ruled out the British model.

  50. 50.

    Original Chinese text: 一、大清皇帝統治大清國,萬世一係,永永尊載。Article 1 of Chapter I of the Japanese constitution of 11 February 1889 states the following: “The Japanese State will be ruled forever by an uninterrupted succession of Emperors.”

  51. 51.

    Original Chinese text: 二、君上神聖尊嚴,不可侵犯。This compares with article 3 of Chapter I of the Japanese Constitution of 11 February 1889: “The person of the Emperor is holy and inviolable”.

  52. 52.

    A full translation of these “Outlines” is to be found in Meienberger (1980: 91–93). The autocratic nature of the planned constitutional monarchy can be seen especially in article 1 of the “Outlines of the Parliamentary Law” which was also approved on 27 August 1908: “The parliament has only deliberative powers. It has no executive power. Measures which have been decided upon by parliament shall not be carried out by the Government until after the imperial sanction has been obtained.” Cf. Meienberger (1980: 93).

  53. 53.

    The reason why a 9 year period was chosen for the planned implementation of a constitutional form of government in China is probably to be explained by the fact that in Japan the Constitution came into force [on 29 November 1890] exactly nine years after the announcement made by the government in 1881 to establish a Constitution “within the next 10 years”; cf. Meienberger (1980: 82) and Sect. 6.3.

  54. 54.

    These had already been established in the years 1907 and 1908.

  55. 55.

    Hsü (2000: 474). This pledge was repeated by Yuan 袁 in 1913, cf. Ch’en (1961: 201).

  56. 56.

    The full text of these Articles is rendered in its Chinese original and in an English translation in Mühlemann (2006: 359–361).

  57. 57.

    Cf. Tammann (1999) and Kua (1998).

  58. 58.

    Because the establishment in 1934 of the Empire of Manzhouguo 滿州國 with the last Emperor of China, Aisin-Gioro Puyi 愛新覺羅溥儀, as ruler, by the Japanese militarists was not designed by them as a resuscitation of the old Qing 清 Empire, but merely as a tool for carving up China by creating several states in its former area, this monarchy will not be further discussed in this paper.

  59. 59.

    In his research into the question of a possible pretender to China’s Dragon Throne, Tony Scotland found that Aisin-Gioro Yuyan 愛新覚羅毓喦 would have been most entitled to this position. Cf. Scotland (1994: 180). However, as Yuyan 毓喦 passed away in 1997, this position would now belong to his son, Aisin-Gioro Hengzhen 愛新覚羅恆鎮.

  60. 60.

    Cf. the “official website” of the Qing Restoration Organization: http://sites.google.com/site/monarchyrevival/.

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Mühlemann, G. (2012). China and Constitutional Monarchy: Four Short Encounters Around 1900. In: Flüchter, A., Richter, S. (eds) Structures on the Move. Transcultural Research – Heidelberg Studies on Asia and Europe in a Global Context. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19288-3_6

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