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Borrowing-Proofness of the Lindahl Rule in Kolm Triangle Economies

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Social Ethics and Normative Economics

Part of the book series: Studies in Choice and Welfare ((WELFARE))

Abstract

Allocation rules can be manipulated in a variety of ways. Agents may misrepresent their preferences, a possibility that has been extensively studied. They can also take advantage of the control they have over resources, and different kinds of stratagems of this type have been identified. For instance, in a classical exchange economy in which resources are allocated by means of the Walrasian rule, an agent may benefit from withholding some of his endowment. He may even benefit from destroying some of it. Also, he may benefit from transferring some of his endowment to someone else (of course without this second agent being hurt, thereby having no reason not to accept the transfer). For a discussion of these phenomena, see Gale (1974), Aumann and Peleg (1974), Postlewaite (1979), and Thomson (1987a,b). Additional manipulation opportunities are discussed in Thomson (2007).

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, 14618, USA

    William Thomson

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  1. William Thomson
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Correspondence to William Thomson .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. , CERSES, University Paris Descartes, rue des Saints-Pères 45, Paris, 75006, France

    Marc Fleurbaey

  2. , CREM, UMR-CNRS 6211, University of Caen, rue Claude Bloch 17, Caen Cedex, 14032, France

    Maurice Salles

  3. , Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, Vanderbilt Place 2301, Nashville, 37215-1819, Tennessee, USA

    John A. Weymark

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Thomson, W. (2011). Borrowing-Proofness of the Lindahl Rule in Kolm Triangle Economies. In: Fleurbaey, M., Salles, M., Weymark, J. (eds) Social Ethics and Normative Economics. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17807-8_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17807-8_7

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