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Strengthening XSRF Defenses for Legacy Web Applications Using Whitebox Analysis and Transformation

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Information Systems Security (ICISS 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6503))

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Abstract

Cross Site Request Forgery (XSRF) is regarded as one of the major threats on the Web. In this paper, we propose an approach that automatically retrofits the source code of legacy web applications with a widely-used defense approach for this attack. Our approach addresses a number of shortcomings in prior blackbox solutions for automatic XSRF protection. Our approach has been implemented in a tool called X-Protect that was used to retrofit several commercial Java-based web applications. Our experimental results demonstrate that the X-Protect approach is both effective and efficient in practice.

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Zhou, M., Bisht, P., Venkatakrishnan, V.N. (2010). Strengthening XSRF Defenses for Legacy Web Applications Using Whitebox Analysis and Transformation. In: Jha, S., Mathuria, A. (eds) Information Systems Security. ICISS 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6503. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17714-9_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17714-9_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-17713-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-17714-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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