Abstract
Protection persists despite its weighty costs, and many studies have investigated its causes. Still unresolved is the question of why some industries receive significantly more protection than others. Shedding light on what explains the variation of trade barriers across industries may suggest more effective strategies for reducing protection (see [19]; and [30]). Also, incorporating the politics of trade is likely to improve trade theory (for example, see [8]).
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Bradford, S. (2004). Protection and Jobs: Explaining the Structure of Trade Barriers Across Industries. In: Katayama, S., Ursprung, H.W. (eds) International Economic Policies in a Globalized World. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17134-5_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17134-5_6
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