Abstract
The king of refinements of Nash equilibrium is trembling hand perfection. We show that it is NP-hard and Sqrt-Sum-hard to decide if a given pure strategy Nash equilibrium of a given three-player game in strategic form with integer payoffs is trembling hand perfect. Analogous results are shown for a number of other solution concepts, including proper equilibrium, (the strategy part of) sequential equilibrium, quasi-perfect equilibrium and CURB.
The proofs all use a reduction from the problem of comparing the minmax value of a three-player game in strategic form to a given rational number. This problem was previously shown to be NP-hard by Borgs et al., while a Sqrt-Sum hardness result is given in this paper. The latter proof yields bounds on the algebraic degree of the minmax value of a three-player game that may be of independent interest.
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Hansen, K.A., Miltersen, P.B., Sørensen, T.B. (2010). The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements. In: Kontogiannis, S., Koutsoupias, E., Spirakis, P.G. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6386. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_18
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