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Abstract

Designing distributed protocols is challenging, as it requires actions at very different levels: from the choice of network-level mechanisms to protect the exchange of sensitive data, to the definition of structured interaction patterns to convey application-specific guarantees. Current security infrastructures provide very limited support for the specification of such guarantees. As a consequence, the high-level security properties of a protocol typically must often be hard-coded explicitly, in terms of low-level cryptographic notions and devices which clutter the design and undermine its scalability and robustness.

To counter these problems, we propose an extended Alice & Bob notation for protocol narrations (AnBx) to be employed for a purely declarative modelling of distributed protocols. These abstractions provide a compact specification of the high-level security guarantees they convey, and help shield the design from the details of the underlying cryptographic infrastructure. We discuss an implementation of the abstractions based on a translation from the AnBx notation to the AnB language supported by the OFMC [1,2] verification tool. We show the practical effectiveness of our approach by revisiting the iKP e-payment protocols, and showing that the security goals achieved by our declarative specification outperform those offered by the original protocols.

Keywords

Model Checker Security Protocol Cryptographic Protocol Security Goal Forward Mode 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michele Bugliesi
    • 1
  • Paolo Modesti
    • 1
  1. 1.Dipartimento di InformaticaUniversità Ca’ Foscari VeneziaItaly

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