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A Formal Model of Identity Mixer

  • Conference paper
Formal Methods for Industrial Critical Systems (FMICS 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNPSE,volume 6371))

Abstract

Identity Mixer is an anonymous credential system developed at IBM that allows users for instance to prove that they are over 18 years old without revealing their name or birthdate. This privacy-friendly technology is realized using zero-knowledge proofs. We describe a formal model of Identity Mixer that is well-suited for automated protocol verification tools in the spirit of black-box cryptography models.

This work was partially supported by the EU-funded projects AVANTSSAR and PrimeLife (grant agreements 216471 and 216483). The authors enjoyed discussions with Alberto Calvi, Luca Viganò, and Greg Zaverucha. Thank you!

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. DTU Informatics, Denmark

    Sebastian Mödersheim

  2. IBM Research, Zurich, Switzerland

    Jan Camenisch & Dieter Sommer

Authors
  1. Jan Camenisch
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  2. Sebastian Mödersheim
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  3. Dieter Sommer
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Embedded Software Laboratory, RWTH Aachen, Ahornstr. 55, 52074, Aachen, Germany

    Stefan Kowalewski

  2. Fondazione Bruno Kessler — IRST, Via Sommarive 18, 38123, Povo (Trento), Italy

    Marco Roveri

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Camenisch, J., Mödersheim, S., Sommer, D. (2010). A Formal Model of Identity Mixer . In: Kowalewski, S., Roveri, M. (eds) Formal Methods for Industrial Critical Systems. FMICS 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6371. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15898-8_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15898-8_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-15897-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-15898-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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