Abstract
Gennaro et al. initiated the study of algorithmic tamper proof (ATP) cryptography: cryptographic hardware that remains secure even in the presence of an adversary who can tamper with the memory content of a hardware device. In this paper, we solve an open problem stated in their paper, and also consider whether a device can be secured against an adversary who can both tamper with its memory and probe a few memory locations or wires at a time. Our results are as follows:
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It is impossible to realize a secure cryptographic functionality with a personal identification number (PIN) where a user is allowed to make up to ℓ incorrect consecutive attempts to enter her PIN, with no total limit on incorrect PIN attempts. (This was left as an open problem by Gennaro et al.)
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It is impossible to secure a deterministic cryptographic device against an adversary who is allowed to both tamper with the memory of the device and probe a memory location; it is also essentially infeasible to secure it if the adversary’s probing power is restricted to internal wires; it is impossible to secure it against an adversary whose probing power is restricted to internal wires, but who is also allowed to tamper with a few internal wires.
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By extending the results of Ishai et al., we show that a cryptographic device with a true source of randomness can withstand tampering and limited probing attacks at the same time.
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Liu, FH., Lysyanskaya, A. (2010). Algorithmic Tamper-Proof Security under Probing Attacks. In: Garay, J.A., De Prisco, R. (eds) Security and Cryptography for Networks. SCN 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6280. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15317-4_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15317-4_8
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