Abstract
In recent years researches in the field of cognitive psychology have favored an interpretation of moral behavior primarily as the product of basic, automatic and unconscious cognitive mechanisms for the processing of information, rather than of some form of principled reasoning. This paper aims at undermining this view and to sustain the old-fashioned thesis according to which moral judgments are produced by specific forms of reasoning. As critical reference our research specifically addresses the so called Rawlsian model which hinges on the idea that human beings produce their moral judgments on the basis of a moral modular faculty “that enables each individual to unconsciously and automatically evaluate a limitless variety of actions in terms of principles that dictate what is permissible, obligatory, or forbidden”.[25, p. 36] In this regard we try to show that this model is not able to account for the moral behavior of different social groups and different individuals in critical situations, when their own moral judgment disagrees with the moral position of their community. Furthermore, the critical consideration of the Rawlsian model constitutes the theoretical basis for the constructive part of our argument, which consists of a proposal about how to develop a semantic, quasi-rationalistic model to describe moral reasoning. This model aims to account for both moral reasoning and the corresponding emotions on the basis of the information which morally relevant concepts consist of.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Carey, S.: Conceptual Change in Childhood. MIT Press, Cambridge (1985)
Carey, S.: Knowledge acquisition: Enrichment or conceptual change? In: Carley, S., Gelman, R. (eds.) The Epigenesis of Mind: Essays on Biology and Cognition, Hillsdale, pp. 257–291. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah (1991)
Carruthers, P.: Moderately massive modularity. In: O’Hear, A. (ed.) Mind and Person, pp. 67–90. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2003)
Chomsky, N.: Recent Contributions to the theory of innate ideas. Synthese 17, 2–11 (1967)
Chomsky, N.: Reflections on Language. Pantheon Books, New York (1975)
Chomsky, N.: Knowledge of Language. Its Nature, Origin and Use. Praeger, New York (1986)
Chomsky, N.: Language and Problems of Knowledge: The Managua Lectures. MIT Press, Cambridge (1988)
Dellantonio, S.: Die interne Dimension der Bedeutung. Externalismus, Internalismus und semantische Kompetenz. Peter Lang Verlag, Hamburg, New York (2007)
Dellantonio, S., Pastore, L.: What do concepts consist of? The role of geometric and proprioceptive information in categorization. In: Hanna, P., McEvoy, A., Voutsina, P. (eds.) An Anthology of Philosophical Studies, pp. 91–102. ATINER, Athens (2006)
Dellantonio, S., Pastore, L.: Teorie morali e contenuto cognitivo. Cognitivismo, postmoderno e relativismo culturale. In: Meattini, V., Pastore, L. (eds.) Identità, individuo, soggetto, pp. 139–178. Mimesis, Milano (2009a)
Dellantonio, S., Pastore, L.: Struttura categoriale e categorizzazione. Un’ipotesi sull’origine della rappresentazione semantica. In: Dellantonio, S., Pastore, L. (eds.) Percezione, rappresentazione e coscienza, pp. 195–230. ETS, Pisa (2009b)
Dwyer, S.: Moral competence. In: Murasugi, K., Stainton, R. (eds.) Philosophy and Linguistics, pp. 169–190. Westview Press, Boulder (1999)
Dwyer, S.: How good is the linguistic analogy? In: Carruthers, P., Laurence, S., Stich, S. (eds.) The Innate Mind. Culture and Cognition, vol. 2, pp. 237–256. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2006)
Dwyer, S.: How not to argue that morality isn’t innate: comments on Prinz. In: Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (ed.) Moral Psychology. The Evaluation of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness, vol. 1, pp. 407–418. MIT Press, Cambridge (2008)
Frank, R.: Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of Emotions. Norton, New York (1988)
Goldman, A.I.: Simulating Minds. The Philosophy and Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford University Press, New York (2006)
Gordon, R.: Sympathy, simulation, and the impartial spectator. Ethics 105, 729–742 (1995)
Haidt, J.: The emotional dog and its rational trail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review 108, 814–834 (2001)
Haidt, J., Bjorklund, F.: Social intuitionists answer six questions about moral psychology. In: Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (ed.) Moral Psychology. The Cognitive Science Of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, vol. 2, pp. 181–217. MIT Press, Cambridge (2008)
Heidt, J., Joseph, C.: Intuitive ethics: How innately prepared intuitions generate culturally variable virtues. Daedalus 133(44), 55–66 (2004)
Haidt, J., Graham, J.: When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have moral intuitions that liberals not recognize. Social Justice Research 20, 98–116 (2007)
Haidt, J., Joseph, C.: The moral mind. In: Carruthers, P., Laurence, S., Stich, S. (eds.) The Innate Mind. Foundations and the Future, vol. 3, pp. 367–391. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2007)
Haidt, J., Koller, S., Dias, M.: Affect, culture, and morality, or is it wrong to eat your dog? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65, 613–628 (1993)
Harman, G.: Explaining Value. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1999)
Hauser, M.D.: Moral Minds. How Nature Designed our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong. HarperCollins Publisher, New York (2006)
Hauser, M.D., Young, L., Cushman, F.: Reviving Rawls’s Linguistic Analogy: Operative Principles and the Causal Structure of Moral Actions. In: Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (ed.) Moral Psychology. The Cognitive Science Of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, vol. 2, pp. 107–143. MIT Press, Cambridge (2008)
Hoffman, M.L.: Development of prosocial motivation: Empathy and guilt. In: Eisenberg-Berg, N. (ed.) Development of Prosocial Behavior, pp. 281–313. Academic Press, New York (1982)
Hoffman, M.L.: Affective and cognitive processes in moral internalization: An information processing approach. In: Higgins, E.T., Ruble, D., Hartup, W. (eds.) Social Cognition and Social Development: A Socio-Cultural Perspective, pp. 236–274. Cambridge University Press, New York (1983)
Hoffman, M.L.: The contribution of empathy to justice and moral judgment. In: Eisenberg, N., Strayer, J. (eds.) Empathy and its development, pp. 47–80. Cambridge University Press, New York (1987)
Jackendoff, R.: Languages of the Mind. Essays on Mental Representation. MIT Press, Cambridge (1992)
Kagan, J.: The Nature of the Child. Basic Books, New York (1984)
Kelly, D., Stich, S.: Two theories about the cognitive architecture underlying morality. In: Carruthers, P., Laurence, S., Stich, S. (eds.) The Innate Mind. Foundations and the Future, vol. 3, pp. 348–366. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2007)
Kohlberg, L.: Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. In: Goslin, D.A. (ed.) Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, pp. 347–380. Rand McNally, Chicago (1969)
Kohlberg, L.: From is to ought: How to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral development. In: Mischel, T. (ed.) Cognitive Development and Epistemology, pp. 151–235. Academic Press, New York (1971)
Kohlberg, L.: The Psychology of Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of Moral Stages. Harper and Row, New York (1984)
Mahlmann, M.: Rationalismus in der praktischen Theorie: Normentheorie und praktische Kompetenz. Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden (1999)
Mikheil, J.: Rawls’ Linguistic Analogy. Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University Press (2000)
Mikheil, J.: Comment on Sripada. In: Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (ed.) Moral Psychology. The Evaluation of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness, vol. 1, pp. 353–359. MIT Press, Cambridge (2008)
Murphy, G., Medin, D.: The role of theories in conceptual coherence. Psychological Review 92(3), 289–316 (1985)
Nichols, S.: Norms with feeling: Toward a psychological account of moral judgment. Cognition 84, 221–236 (2002)
Nichols, S.: Sentimental Rules: On The Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2004)
Nichols, S.: Innateness and moral psychology. In: Carruthers, P., Laurence, S., Stich, S. (eds.) The Innate Mind. Structure and Contents, pp. 353–370. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005)
Nucci, L.: Children’s conceptions of morality, social conventions and religious prescription. In: Harding, C. (ed.) Moral Dilemmas: Philosophical and Psychological Reconsiderations of the Development of Moral Reasoning, pp. 137–174. Precedent Press, Chicago (1986)
Nucci, L.: Education in the Moral Domain. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2001)
Prinz, J.J.: The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2007)
Prinz, J.J.: Is morality innate? In: Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (ed.) Moral Psychology. The Evaluation of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness, vol. 1, pp. 367–406. MIT Press, Cambridge (2008)
Quine, W.V.O.: Two dogmas of empiricism. In: Quine, W.V.O. (ed.) From a logical point of view, pp. 20–46. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1961)
Rawls, J.: A Theory of Justice. Belknap Press, Cambridge (1971)
Remotti, F.: Contro natura. Laterza, Roma Bari (2008)
Samuels, R.: Massively modular minds: Evolutionary psychology and cognitive architecture. In: Carruthers, P., Chamberlain, A. (eds.) Evolution and the Human Mind: Modularity, Language and Meta-cognition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2000)
Schweder, R.A., Heidt, J.: The future of moral psychology: Truth, intuition, and the pluralist way. Psychological Science 4, 360–365 (1993)
Smentana, J.: Understanding of social rules. In: Bennett, M. (ed.) The Development of Social Cognition: The Child as Psychologist, pp. 111–141. Guilford Press, New York (1993)
Smentana, J., Braeges, J.: The development of toddlers’ moral and conventional judgments. Merril-Parmer Quarterly 36, 329–346 (1990)
Sripada, C.S., Stich, S.: A framework for the psychology of norms. In: Carruthers, P., Laurence, S., Stich, S. (eds.) The Innate Mind. Culture and Cognition, vol. 2, pp. 280–301. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2006)
Thomas, L.: Morality and psychological development. In: Singer, P. (ed.) A Companion to Ethics, pp. 464–475. Blackwell, Oxford (2006)
Tisak, M.: Domains of social reasoning and beyond. In: Vasta, R. (ed.) Annals of Child Development, vol. II, pp. 95–130. Jessica Kingsley, London (1995)
Turiel, E.: The Development of Social Knowledge. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1983)
Turiel, E.: The Culture of Morality: Social Development, Context, and Conflicts. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2002)
Turiel, E., Killen, M., Helwig, C.: Morality: Its Structure, functions, and vagaries. In: Kagan, J., Lamb, S. (eds.) The Emergence of Morality on Young Children, pp. 155–244. University of Chicago, Chicago (1987)
Wilson, J.Q.: The Moral Sense. Free Press, New York (1993)
Zahn-Waxler, C., Radke-Yarrow, M., Wagner, E., Chapman, M.: Development of concerns for others. Developmental Psychology 28, 126–136 (1992)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Dellantonio, S., Job, R. (2010). Morality According to a Cognitive Interpretation: A Semantic Model for Moral Behavior. In: Magnani, L., Carnielli, W., Pizzi, C. (eds) Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Studies in Computational Intelligence, vol 314. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15223-8_28
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15223-8_28
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-15222-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-15223-8
eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)