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Signal Authentication in Trusted Satellite Navigation Receivers

  • Markus G. KuhnEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Information Security and Cryptography book series (ISC)

Abstract

Physical location can be an important security parameter, whether for location-based access control or to audit the whereabouts of goods and people. In outdoor applications, location is often most easily determined with a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receiver. This means today primarily GPS [9, 11], but the list is growing (GLONASS, Galileo, Beidou/Compass, etc.). Each of these operates a constellation of the Earth-orbiting satellites that broadcast a high-precision time signal, along with a low bit rate data stream (50–1,000 bit/s) that carries orbital position (ephemeris) predictions and calibration data.

Keywords

Global Navigation Satellite System Global Navigation Satellite System Spreading Sequence Tracking Loop Global Navigation Satellite System Receiver 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the European Commission under FP7 grant 228443 (TIGER project).

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Computer LaboratoryUniversity of CambridgeCambridgeUK

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