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Energy Theft in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure

  • Stephen McLaughlin
  • Dmitry Podkuiko
  • Patrick McDaniel
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6027)

Abstract

Global energy generation and delivery systems are transitioning to a new computerized “smart grid”. One of the principle components of the smart grid is an advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). AMI replaces the analog meters with computerized systems that report usage over digital communication interfaces, e.g., phone lines. However, with this infrastructure comes new risk. In this paper, we consider adversary means of defrauding the electrical grid by manipulating AMI systems. We document the methods adversaries will use to attempt to manipulate energy usage data, and validate the viability of these attacks by performing penetration testing on commodity devices. Through these activities, we demonstrate that not only is theft still possible in AMI systems, but that current AMI devices introduce a myriad of new vectors for achieving it.

Keywords

AMI Smart meter Penetration testing Attack tree 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stephen McLaughlin
    • 1
  • Dmitry Podkuiko
    • 1
  • Patrick McDaniel
    • 1
  1. 1.Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS)Pennsylvania State UniversityUniversity Park

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