Abstract
[Context and motivation] In the development of secure software, work on requirements and on architecture need to be closely intertwined, because possible threats and the chosen architecture depend on each other mutually. [Question/problem] Nevertheless, most security requirement techniques do not take architecture into account. The transition from security requirements to secure architectures is left to security experts and software developers, excluding domain experts and other groups of stakeholders from discussions of threats, vulnerabilities and mitigations in an architectural context. [Principal idea/results] The paper introduces misuse case maps, a new modelling technique that is the anti-behavioural complement to use case maps. The purpose of the new technique is to visualize how cyber attacks are performed in an architectural context. [Contribution] The paper investigates what a misuse case map notation might look like. A preliminary evaluation suggests that misuse case maps may indeed make it easier for less experienced stakeholders to gain an understanding of multi-stage intrusion scenarios.
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Karpati, P., Sindre, G., Opdahl, A.L. (2010). Visualizing Cyber Attacks with Misuse Case Maps. In: Wieringa, R., Persson, A. (eds) Requirements Engineering: Foundation for Software Quality. REFSQ 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6182. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14192-8_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14192-8_24
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