Towards a Logical Analysis of the Judgment on Facts
The starting point of the following remarks is that a fundamental aspect of judicial decisions (mainly in trial courts but often also in appellate courts) is the judgment about the facts in issue. In a sense, actually, judicial decisions derive from a sort of combination of legal and factual judgments. Lawyers -and logicians- usually deal with the legal dimension of these decisions and analyze the features and the structure of legal arguments and of legal justifications of a decision. However, the factual dimension of such decisions is no less important since -as it is commonly said- no decision is just if it is based upon the wrong facts.
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