Avoiding Deontic Explosion by Contextually Restricting Aggregation
In this paper, we present an adaptive logic for deontic conflicts, called P2.1 r , that is based on Goble’s logic SDL a P e—a bimodal extension of Goble’s logic P that invalidates aggregation for all prima facie obligations. The logic P2.1 r has several advantages with respect to SDL a P e. For consistent sets of obligations it yields the same results as Standard Deontic Logic and for inconsistent sets of obligations, it validates aggregation “as much as possible”. It thus leads to a richer consequence set than SDL a P e. The logic P2.1 r avoids Goble’s criticisms against other non-adjunctive systems of deontic logic. Moreover, it can handle all the ‘toy examples’ from the literature as well as more complex ones.
KeywordsConflict-tolerant deontic logic non-adjunctive deontic logic deontic explosion defeasible deontic reasoning adaptive logic
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 5.Schotch, P.K., Jennings, R.E.: Non-kripkean deontic logic. In: Hilpinen, R. (ed.) New Studies in Deontic logic, pp. 149–162. Reidel, Dordrecht (1981)Google Scholar
- 8.Batens, D.: Adaptive Logics and Dynamic Proofs. Mastering the Dynamics of Reasoning, with Special Attention to Handling Inconsistency (forthcoming)Google Scholar
- 11.Holbo, J.: Moral dilemmas and the logic of obligation. American Philosophical Quarterly 39, 259–274 (2002)Google Scholar
- 12.Routley, R., Plumwood, V.: Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions. In: Priest, G., Routley, R., Norman, J. (eds.) Paraconsistent Logic. Essays on the Inconsistent, pp. 653–702. Philosophia Verlag, München (1989)Google Scholar
- 13.McConnell, T.: Moral dilemmas (2006), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-dilemmas/