A Process with Sufficient Speed: Incentives for Progress



So far, we have argued that process management is characterized by openness. The main stakeholders are invited to participate in a process and are involved in drawing up the agenda. Openness, however, is not without risk for these stakeholders. They can perceive the process as a funnel trap: once they have joined, they may feel that they are forced in a certain direction without being able to leave the process. It is therefore important that parties’ core values are protected. For the sake of these core values, parties are offered room at crucial moments. For instance, they are not required to commit to the result of the process beforehand, and they are offered an exit option.


Process Manager Cooperative Behaviour Smart City Interim Result Moderate Behaviour 
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Copyright information

© Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Technology, Policy and ManagementDelft University of TechnologyBX DelftNetherlands
  2. 2.JH LeiderdorpNetherlands

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