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Interpretation of the Criminal Norm

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A Modern Treatise on the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law

Abstract

The fourth secondary principle of the principle of legality in criminal law concerns the interpretation of the criminal norm, which is required for its legitimacy as a legal social control. This secondary principle refers to criminal norms as verbal formulations and addresses the issues of their application through interpretation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See above at Sects. 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.

  2. 2.

    Hereinafter at Sects. 5.2.1–5.2.4.

  3. 3.

    Above at Sects. 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.

  4. 4.

    Thomas P. Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 Supreme Court Rev. 101, 110 (1963).

  5. 5.

    Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence in Political Institutions, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 917 (1990); Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 Yale L. J. 399 (2001).

  6. 6.

    See e.g. Frederick Woodbridge, Physical and Mental Infancy in the Criminal Law, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 426 (1939); A.W.G. Kean, The History of the Criminal Liability of Children, 53 L. Q. Rev. 364 (1937); Benjamin B. Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Interpretive Theory of the Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 Geo. L. J. 1371, 1380 (1986); Joseph H. Rodriguez, Laura M. LeWinn and Michael L. Perlin, The Insanity Defense Under Siege: Legislative Assaults and Legal Rejoinders, 14 Rutgers L. J. 397, 406–407 (1983); Homer D. Crotty, The History of Insanity as a Defence to Crime in English Common Law, 12 Cal. L. Rev. 105 (1924).

  7. 7.

    Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 46–91 (1964).

  8. 8.

    Herbert L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (1958).

  9. 9.

    BVerfGE 26, 41, 43; BVerfGE 48, 48, 56; BGH St 30, 285, 287.

  10. 10.

    BayVGH 4 (1951) II 194: “…gegen die öffentliche Ordnung verstöβt oder gegen die Interessen der alliierten Streitkräfte oder eines ihrer Mitglieder handelt”.

  11. 11.

    Ralph W. Aigler, Legislation in Vague or General Terms, 21 Mich. L. Rev. 831 (1923); United States v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 278, 11 S.Ct. 538, 35 L.Ed. 190 (1891).

  12. 12.

    United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 23 L.Ed. 563 (1876); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 23 S.Ct. 678, 47 L.Ed. 979 (1903); United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 68 S.Ct. 634, 92 L.Ed. 823 (1948).

  13. 13.

    Ernst Freund, The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes, 30 Yale L. J. 437 (1921); Rex A. Collings Jr., Unconstitutional Uncertainty – An Appraisal, 40 Cornell L. Q. 195 (1955); Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal Statutes – Balancing Acts, 5 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 1 (1997).

  14. 14.

    Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926).

  15. 15.

    The contradiction is to the sixth amendment of the American constitution which provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense” (emphasis not in original); See more in Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 46 S.Ct. 619, 70 L.Ed. 1059 (1926); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 41 S.Ct. 298, 65 L.Ed. 516 (1921).

  16. 16.

    Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939).

  17. 17.

    Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840 (1948); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 88 S.Ct. 1298, 20 L.Ed.2d 225 (1968); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 99 S.Ct. 675, 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979).

  18. 18.

    United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 68 S.Ct. 634, 92 L.Ed. 823 (1948).

  19. 19.

    Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840 (1948); Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 86 S.Ct. 1407, 16 L.Ed.2d 469 (1966); M. Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 66 S.Ct. 705, 90 L.Ed. 894 (1946); United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 80 S.Ct. 459, 4 L.Ed.2d 423 (1960).

  20. 20.

    In Lanzetta, supra note 16, the court ruled that “[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids”.

  21. 21.

    City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 91 S.Ct. 1563, 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 86 S.Ct. 211, 15 L.Ed.2d 176 (1965); BVerfGE 25, 269, 285; BVerfGE 26, 42; BVerfGE 37, 207; BVerfGE 57, 250, 262; Volker Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Teil I: Grundlagen 92–93 (2002); Hans-Heinrich Jescheck und Thomas Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts – Allgemeiner Teil 136–137 (Auf., 1996).

  22. 22.

    Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 47 S.Ct. 681, 71 L.Ed. 1146 (1927).

  23. 23.

    United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 38 S.Ct. 323, 62 L.Ed. 763 (1918).

  24. 24.

    In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) the court ruled that “[c]ondemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language”.

  25. 25.

    Hereinafter at Sect. 5.3.3.

  26. 26.

    McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931).

  27. 27.

    United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 83 S.Ct. 594, 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954).

  28. 28.

    See e.g. article 23 of the Private Security Industry Act, 2001, c.12.

  29. 29.

    See e.g. in Smith, (1869) 11 Cox C.C. 210; State v. Harrison, 107 N.J.L. 213, 152 A. 867 (1931); State v. Benton, 38 Del. 1, 187 A. 609 (1936); Davis v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 201, 335 S.E.2d 375 (1985); People v. Wong, 182 A.D.2d 98, 588 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1992); Commonwealth v. Pestinikas, 421 Pa.Super. 371, 617 A.2d 1339 (1992); State v. O’Brian, 32 N.J.L. 169 (1867); Anderson v. State, 27 Tex.App. 177, 11 S.W. 33, 3 L.R.A. 644, 11 Am.St.Rep. 189 (1889).

  30. 30.

    See e.g. 228(2) of the Marine and Coastal Access Act, 2009, c.23 that provides: “A person who unlawfully takes or destroys, or attempts to take or destroy, any fish in water which is private property or in which there is any private right of fishery shall on summary conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale” (emphasis not in original).

  31. 31.

    Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 100 (4th ed., 2003).

  32. 32.

    Commonwealth v. Mumma, 489 Pa. 547, 414 A.2d 1026 (1980); State v. Bautista, 86 Hawaii 207, 948 P.2d 1048 (1997); Hines v. State, 40 S.W.3d 705 (Tex.App.2001).

  33. 33.

    State v. Elliot, 177 Conn. 1, 411 A.2d 3 (1979); State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30, 695 A.2d 1301 (1997); State v. Willy, 155 Or.App. 279, 963 P.2d 739 (1998).

  34. 34.

    State v. Chaplain, 101 Kan. 413, 166 P. 238 (1917).

  35. 35.

    State v. Ross, 573 N.W.2d 906 (Iowa 1998); State v. Olsen, 618 N.W.2d 346 (Iowa 2000).

  36. 36.

    People v. Frysig, 628 P.2d 1004 (Colo.1981); State v. Burger, 590 N.W.2d 197 (N.D.1999).

  37. 37.

    Lawrence Collins, Dicey and Morris The Conflict of Laws I I 1216, 1236 (13th ed., 2000).

  38. 38.

    Above at Sect. 5.2.

  39. 39.

    The first stage is discussed hereinafter at Sects. 5.3.1–5.3.4.

  40. 40.

    The second stage is discussed hereinafter at Sect. 5.3.4.

  41. 41.

    The third stage is discussed hereinafter at Sect. 5.3.6.

  42. 42.

    LaFave, supra note 31, at pp. 8–9.

  43. 43.

    A status offense is an offense that requires no conduct element within its factual element requirement. The offender becomes an offender not because of a certain behavior but for being in a certain status, which the individual does not necessarily control. For instance, a specific offense of “whoever is a catholic, shall…” is a status offense. This platform of offenses enables the regime persecuting individuals for what they are and not for what they do. See e.g. in Ex Parte Smith, 135 Mo. 223, 36 S.W. 628 (1896); Proctor v. State, 15 Okl.Cr. 338, 176 P. 771 (1918); State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d 617 (1951); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962); In re Leory, 285 Md. 508, 403 A.2d 1226 (1979).

  44. 44.

    State v. Collins, 55 Wash.2d 469, 348 P.2d 214 (1960).

  45. 45.

    See e.g. in articles 242 and 243 of the German penal code.

  46. 46.

    See e.g. in article 212 of the German penal code.

  47. 47.

    BGH St 35, 390, 395; BVerfGE 73, 206, 234.

  48. 48.

    BVerfGE 71, 108; BGH 18, 136, 140; RG 32, 165; RG 68, 65; BGH 2, 317, 319; BGH 3, 259, 262; BGH 5, 129; BGH 7, 256; BGH 10, 375; BGH 11, 117; BGH 14, 116; BGH 23, 40; BGH 29, 129; BGH 33, 244; Jescheck und Weigend, supra note 21, at pp. 134–135.

  49. 49.

    Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 36–38 (2nd ed., 1960, 2005).

  50. 50.

    See above at Sect. 2.2.2.4.

  51. 51.

    LaBarge v. State, 74 Wis.2d 327, 246 N.W.2d 794 (1976).

  52. 52.

    McCord v. People, 46 N.Y. 470 (1871); People v. Tompkins, 186 N.Y. 413, 79 N.E. 326 (1906).

  53. 53.

    In most cases the question of deduction is wider, since there are very many general terms in which the process of deduction may be too wide for their original meaning and interpretation. E.g. the term “thing” as discussed in RG 32, 165.

  54. 54.

    Krey, supra note 21, at pp. 72–73; ZStW 1964, 13.

  55. 55.

    BVerfGE 71, 108; BGH 18, 136, 140; Jescheck und Weigend, supra note 21, at pp. 134–136; ACP 10987/07 State v. Cohen (unreported, March 2, 2009).

  56. 56.

    Walter V. Schaefer, The Control of ‘Sunbursts’: Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 631 (1967); Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct. 145, 77 L.Ed. 360 (1932); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bryant, 296 Ky. 815, 177 S.W.2d 588 (1943); Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.Cir.1954).

  57. 57.

    Stephen F. Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73 Wash. U. L. Q. 1057 (1995); Michael S. Moore, Plain Meaning and Linguistics – A Case Study, 73 Wash. U. L. Q. 1253 (1995); David A. Strauss, Why Plain Meaning?, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1565 (1997).

  58. 58.

    Article 111-4 of the French penal code provides that “La loi pénale est d’interprétation stricte”.

  59. 59.

    Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995).

  60. 60.

    Reed F. Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes 229–233 (1975).

  61. 61.

    Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892); People v. Clark, 242 N.Y. 313, 151 N.E. 631 (1926); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 115 S.Ct. 464, 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994); Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 127 (1994).

  62. 62.

    See e.g. Sullens, 1 Mood. 129, 168 E.R. 1212 (1826); Commonwealth v. Ryan, 155 Mass. 523, 30 N.E. 364 (1892); Ker v. People, 110 Ill. 627 (1884); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886); Bismarck v. State, 45 Tex.Crim. 54, 73 S.W. 965 (1903); United States v. Whitlock, 663 F.2d 1094 (D.C.Cir.1980).

  63. 63.

    See State v. Mellenberger, 163 Or. 233, 95 P.2d 709 (1939) in relation to State v. Alexander, 76 Or. 329, 148 P. 1136 (1915).

  64. 64.

    State v. Bell, 136 N.C. 674, 49 S.E. 163 (1904); State v. Jones, 44 N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940).

  65. 65.

    See above at Sect. 2.2.1.4.

  66. 66.

    State v. O’Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 126 N.W. 454 (1910); State v. Longino, 109 Miss. 125, 67 So. 902 (1915).

  67. 67.

    Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History without Legislative Intent: The Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 Ohio St. L. J. 1 (1999); Edward Heath, How Federal Judges Use Legislative History, 25 J. Legis. 95 (1999); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Seperated Powers, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1457 (2000); John F. Manning, Putting Legislative History to a Vote: A Response to Professor Siegel, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1529 (2000).

  68. 68.

    Jescheck und Weigend, supra note 21, at p. 90.

  69. 69.

    State v. Partlow, 91 N.C. 550 (1884); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979).

  70. 70.

    Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994): “…we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear”; Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 118 S.Ct. 805, 139 L.Ed.2d 830 (1998); Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 120 S.Ct. 2159, 147 L.Ed.2d 203 (2000).

  71. 71.

    S.E.C. v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939 (2nd Cir.1935); Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 966, 143 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).

  72. 72.

    Gossnell v. Spang, 84 F.2d 889 (3rd Cir.1936).

  73. 73.

    Tolson, (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 168, [1889] All E.R. 26; Commonwealth v. Mash, 48 Mass. 472 (1844).

  74. 74.

    Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 71 S.Ct. 745, 95 L.Ed. 1035 (1951).

  75. 75.

    See e.g. article 1 of the Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c.42.

  76. 76.

    Norman J. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction sec. 47.03 (5th ed., 1992); United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 2 L.Ed. 304 (1804).

  77. 77.

    State v. Miller, 74 Kan. 667, 87 P. 723 (1906); State v. Wilchinski, 242 Conn. 211, 700 A.2d 1 (1997).

  78. 78.

    Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 120 S.Ct. 2159, 147 L.Ed.2d 203 (2000): “the title of a statute is of use only when it sheds light on some ambiguous word or phrase in the statute itself”.

  79. 79.

    United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 2 L.Ed. 304 (1804): “It is undoubtedly a well established principle in the exposition of statutes, that every part is to be considered, and the intention of the legislature to be extracted from the whole. It is also true, that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, that construction is to be avoided, unless the meaning of the legislature be plain; in which case it must be obeyed”.

  80. 80.

    Bank of New South Wales v. Piper, [1897] A.C. 383; S.E.C. v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939 (2nd Cir.1935).

  81. 81.

    See above at Sect. 5.3.5.1.

  82. 82.

    State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439, 44 N.E. 469 (1896); State v. Johnston, 149 S.C. 195, 146 S.E. 657 (1929); State v. Dorby, 217 Iowa 858, 250 N.W. 702 (1933).

  83. 83.

    Singer, supra note 76, at paragraphs 47.17–47.22.

  84. 84.

    Above at Sect. 5.3.3.

  85. 85.

    State v. Brantley, 201 Or. 637, 271 P.2d 668 (1954); State v. Kahalewai, 56 Haw. 481, 541 P.2d 1020 (1975); Giant of Maryland, Inc. v. State’s Attorney, 274 Md. 158, 334 A.2d 107 (1975).

  86. 86.

    Above at Sect. 5.3.3.

  87. 87.

    United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 70 S.Ct. 352, 94 L.Ed. 457 (1950); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 96 S.Ct. 316, 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975).

  88. 88.

    La Barge v. State, 74 Wis.2d 327, 246 N.W.2d 794 (1976).

  89. 89.

    Above at Sect. 5.3.

  90. 90.

    United States v. Davis, 978 F.2d 415 (8th Cir.1992).

  91. 91.

    Gabriel Hallevy, Victim’s Complicity in Criminal Law, 2 Int’l J. of Punishment & Sentencing 72 (2006).

  92. 92.

    See e.g. in Britain article 1(1) of the Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c.42 which provides that “[a] person (A) commits an offence if- (a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person (B) with his penis, (b) B does not consent to the penetration, and (c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents”; in Germany article 177(1) of the German penal code which provides that “[w]er eine andere Person (1) mit Gewalt, (2) durch Drohung mit gegenwärtiger Gefahr für Leib oder Leben oder (3) unter Ausnutzung einer Lage, in der das Opfer der Einwirkung des Täters schutzlos ausgeliefert ist, nötigt, sexuelle Handlungen des Täters oder eines Dritten an sich zu dulden oder an dem Täter oder einem Dritten vorzunehmen, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe nicht unter einem Jahr bestraft”; in France article 222-23 of the French penal code which provides that “[t]out acte de pénétration sexuelle, de quelque nature qu’il soit, commis sur la personne d’autrui par violence, contrainte, menace ou surprise est un viol. Le viol est puni de quinze ans de réclusion criminelle”.

  93. 93.

    Tolson, (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 168, [1889] All E.R. 26; People v. Nichols, 3 Cal.3d 150, 89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673 (1970); Glisson v. State, 188 Ga.App. 152, 372 S.E.2d 462 (1988); Walt v. State, 727 A.2d 836 (Del.1999).

  94. 94.

    Haworth v. Chapman, 113 Fla. 591, 152 So. 663 (1933).

  95. 95.

    United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 68 S.Ct. 634, 92 L.Ed. 823 (1948); State v. Archuletta, 526 P.2d 911 (Utah 1974).

  96. 96.

    Fowler v. Padget, (1798) 7 T.R. 509, 101 E.R. 1103; Fagan v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [1969] 1 Q.B. 439, [1968] 3 All E.R. 442, [1968] 3 W.L.R. 1120, 52 Cr. App. Rep. 700, 133 J.P. 16; Miller, [1983] 2 A.C. 161, [1983] 1 All E.R. 978, [1983] 2 W.L.R. 539, 77 Cr. App. Rep. 17; Singh, [1974] 1 All E.R. 26, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1444, 138 J.P. 85; Kaitamaki, [1985] 1 A.C. 147, [1984] 2 All E.R. 435, [1984] 3 W.L.R. 137, [1984] Crim. L.R. 564, 79 Cr. App. Rep. 251; Matthews, [1950] 1 All E.R. 137, 48 L.G.R. 190, 66 T.L.R. (Pt. 1) 153, 114 J.P. 73, 34 Cr. App. Rep. 55; People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 138 N.E.2d 799, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1956); Hill v. Baxter, [1958] 1 Q.B. 277, [1958] 1 All E.R. 193, [1958] 2 W.L.R. 76, 56 L.G.R. 117, 42 Cr. App. Rep. 51; Thabo Meli, [1954] 1 All E.R. 373, [1954] 1 W.L.R. 228; Church, [1966] 1 Q.B. 59, [1965] 2 All E.R. 72, [1965] 2 W.L.R. 1220, 49 Cr. App. Rep. 206, 129 J.P. 366; Le Brun, [1992] Q.B. 61; Geoffrey Marston, Contemporaneity of Act and Intention, 86 Law Q. Rev. 208 (1970); A. R. White, The Identity and Time of the Actus Reus, [1977] Crim. L. Rev. 148 (1977); Ramsay, [1967] N.Z.L.R. 1005; Jackson v. Commonwealth, 100 Ky. 239, 38 S.W. 422 (1896); Masilela, 1968 (2) S.A. 558 (A.D.); Chiswibo, 1960 (2) S.A. 714; Scott, [1967] V.R. 276.

  97. 97.

    Commonwealth v. Wotan, 422 Mass. 740, 665 N.E.2d 976 (1996).

  98. 98.

    See above Fig. 5.2.

  99. 99.

    Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 748 (1935); Leona Christine Gabel, Benefit of Clergy in England in the Later Middle Ages 14 (1928, 1969).

  100. 100.

    John Laurence, A History of Capital Punishment 8 (1932, 1960).

  101. 101.

    See e.g. 4 Hen. VIII, c.2 (1512); 23 Hen. VIII, c.1 (1531); 25 Hen. VIII, c.3, c.6 (1533); 27 Hen. VIII, c.17 (1535); 28 Hen. VIII, c.1 (1536); 37 Hen. VIII, c.8 (1545).

  102. 102.

    See e.g. 18 Eliz. c.7 (1576); 31 Eliz. c.12 (1589); 39 Eliz. c.9 (1597); 39 Eliz. c.15 (1597); 2 Jac. I, c.8 (1604); 21 Jac. I, c.27 (1623).

  103. 103.

    Jerome Hall, Theft, Law and Society 79–81, 87–100 (1935); Harvey, (1747) 1 Wils. K.B. 164, 95 E.R. 551 (1747).

  104. 104.

    Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000).

  105. 105.

    In United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 5 L.Ed. 37, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820) the court ruled that “…though penal laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. The maxim is not to be so applied as to narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion of cases which those words, in their ordinary acceptation, or in that sense in which the legislature has obviously used them, would comprehend. The intention of the legislature is to be collected from the words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. The case must be a strong one indeed, which would justify a Court in departing from the plain meaning of words, especially in a penal act, in search of an intention which the words themselves did not suggest. To determine that a case is within the intention of a statute, its language must authorise us to say so. It would be dangerous, indeed, to carry the principle, that a case which is within the reason or mischief of a statute, is within its provisions, so far as to punish a crime not enumerated in the statute, because it is of equal atrocity, or of kindred character, with those which are enumerated. If this principle has ever been recognized in expounding criminal law, it has been in cases of considerable irritation, which it would be unsafe to consider as precedents forming a general rule for other cases”.

  106. 106.

    State v. Stockton, 97 Wash.2d 528, 647 P.2d 21 (1982); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 110 S.Ct. 997, 108 L.Ed.2d 132 (1990).

  107. 107.

    United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971); State v. Jewell, 345 So.2d 1166 (La.1977).

  108. 108.

    See e.g. article 111-4 of the French penal code.

  109. 109.

    Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997); Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 118 S.Ct. 285, 139 L.Ed.2d 215 (1997); United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 117 S.Ct. 921, 137 L.Ed.2d 107 (1997); Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 118 S.Ct. 2007, 141 L.Ed.2d 303 (1998); Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998); State v. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d 449 (Minn.2002); ACP 10987/07 State v. Cohen (unreported, March 2, 2009).

  110. 110.

    Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 96 S.Ct. 498, 46 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976); State v. Millett, 392 A.2d 521 (Me.1978); State v. Hobokin, 768 S.W.2d 76 (Mo.1989); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993).

  111. 111.

    United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 96 S.Ct. 335, 46 L.Ed.2d 333 (1975); Dover v. State, 664 P.2d 536 (Wyo.1983); United States v. Sepulveda, 115 F.3d 882 (11th Cir.1997).

  112. 112.

    State v. Carter, 89 Wash.2d 236, 570 P.2d 1218 (1977); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 511 Pa. 481, 515 A.2d 558 (1986).

  113. 113.

    Lawrence Collins, Dicey and Morris The Conflict of Laws I 32 (13th ed., 2000).

  114. 114.

    Above at Sect. 5.1.

  115. 115.

    See above at Sect. 5.3.1.

  116. 116.

    See above at Sect. 5.3.2.

  117. 117.

    See above at Sects. 5.3.3–5.3.5.

  118. 118.

    See above at Sect. 5.3.6.

  119. 119.

    Above at Sect. 5.3.

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  1. Faculty of Law, Ono Academic College, Zahal 104, 55000, Kiryat Ono, Israel

    Assoc.Prof. Gabriel Hallevy

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Hallevy, G. (2010). Interpretation of the Criminal Norm. In: A Modern Treatise on the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13714-3_5

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