Abstract
Due to economic benefits, pollution control costs and the compensated side’s strategy to get more compensation, many eco-compensation projects can not achieve desired outcome. In this paper, we assume that the pollution control strength of the compensated side is private information and establish a two-stage dynamic game model with incomplete information to analyze the strategy of the two sides and how incomplete information affects the compensation amount and the pollution level.
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Wang, X., Xu, N., Huang, B. (2010). Invalidity Analysis of Eco-compensation Projects Based on Two-Stage Game. In: Tan, Y., Shi, Y., Tan, K.C. (eds) Advances in Swarm Intelligence. ICSI 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6146. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13498-2_64
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13498-2_64
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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