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Proof-Based Design of Security Protocols

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Computer Science – Theory and Applications (CSR 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 6072))

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Abstract

We consider the refinement-based process for the development of security protocols. Our approach is based on the Event B refinement, which makes proofs easier and which makes the design process faithfull to the structure of the protocol as the designer thinks of it. We introduce the notion of mechanism related to a given security property; a mechanism can be combined with another mechanism through the double refinement process ensuring the preservation of previous security properties of mechanisms. Mechanisms and combination of mechanisms are based on Event B models related to the security property of the current mechanism. Analysing cryptographic protocols requires precise modelling of the attacker’s knowledge and the attacker’s behaviour conforms to the Dolev-Yao model.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. LORIA, Université Henri Poincaré Nancy 1, BP 239, 54506, Vandœuvre-lès-Nancy, France

    Nazim Benaissa & Dominique Méry

Authors
  1. Nazim Benaissa
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  2. Dominique Méry
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Theoretical Cybernetics, Kazan State University, 420008, Kazan, Russia

    Farid Ablayev

  2. Institut für Informatik, Technische Universität München, 85748, Garching, Germany

    Ernst W. Mayr

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Benaissa, N., Méry, D. (2010). Proof-Based Design of Security Protocols. In: Ablayev, F., Mayr, E.W. (eds) Computer Science – Theory and Applications. CSR 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6072. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13182-0_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13182-0_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-13181-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-13182-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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