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Receipt-Free K-out-of-L Voting Based on ElGamal Encryption

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Book cover Towards Trustworthy Elections

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6000))

Abstract

We present a K-out-of-L voting scheme, i.e., a voting scheme that allows every voter to vote for (up to) K candidates from a set of L candidates. The scheme is receipt-free, which means that even a malicious voter cannot prove to anybody how he voted. Furthermore, the scheme can be based on any semantically secure homomorphic encryption scheme, in particular also on the modified ElGamal encryption scheme which does not allow for efficient decryption of arbitrary large messages (but is more efficient than Paillier’s encryption scheme).

We note that in contrast to the standard setting with receipts, in a receipt-free setting a K-out-of-L voting scheme cannot be derived directly from a yes/no voting scheme.

Finally, we show that the voting protocol of Lee and Kim is not receipt-free, opposed to what is claimed in the paper.

A preliminary version of this text can be found in [Hir01, Chapter 5].

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, ETH Zurich,  

    Martin Hirt

Authors
  1. Martin Hirt
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Independent researcher,  

    David Chaum

  2. Palo Alto Research Center, CA, USA

    Markus Jakobsson

  3. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA

    Ronald L. Rivest

  4. University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg

    Peter Y. A. Ryan

  5. Microsoft Research Center, Redmond, WA, USA

    Josh Benaloh

  6. Wroclaw University of Technology, Poland

    Miroslaw Kutylowski

  7. Harvard Center for Research on Computation and Society, Boston, MA, USA

    Ben Adida

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Hirt, M. (2010). Receipt-Free K-out-of-L Voting Based on ElGamal Encryption . In: Chaum, D., et al. Towards Trustworthy Elections. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6000. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-12979-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-12980-3

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