Aperio: High Integrity Elections for Developing Countries

  • Aleks Essex
  • Jeremy Clark
  • Carlisle Adams
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6000)


This article presents an ‘end-to-end’ integrity verification mechanism for use in minimally equipped secret paper-ballot election environments. The scheme presented in this paper achieves high integrity properties without interfering with the traditional marking and tabulation procedures of paper-ballot elections. Officials and auditors can respectively generate and independently verify ‘end-to-end’ audit trails, with office stationery and entirely without cryptographic or mathematic computations.


Vote System Polling Place Audit Trail Election Environment Anonymizing Network 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Aleks Essex
    • 1
  • Jeremy Clark
    • 2
  • Carlisle Adams
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Ottawa 
  2. 2.University of Waterloo 

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