Abstract
Farnel is a voting system proposed in 2001 in which each voter signs a ballot. It uses two ballot boxes to avoid the association between a voter and a vote. In this paper we first point out a flaw in the ThreeBallot system proposed by Rivest that seems to have gone unnoticed so far: it reveals statistical information about who is winning the election. Then, trying to resolve this and other flaws, we present a new, voter-verifiable version of the Farnel voting system in which voters retain copies of ballot IDs as receipts.
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Araújo, R., Custódio, R.F., van de Graaf, J. (2010). A Verifiable Voting Protocol Based on Farnel. In: Chaum, D., et al. Towards Trustworthy Elections. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6000. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_17
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