Public-Key Encryption with Non-Interactive Opening: New Constructions and Stronger Definitions

  • David Galindo
  • Benoît Libert
  • Marc Fischlin
  • Georg Fuchsbauer
  • Anja Lehmann
  • Mark Manulis
  • Dominique Schröder
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-12678-9_20

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6055)
Cite this paper as:
Galindo D. et al. (2010) Public-Key Encryption with Non-Interactive Opening: New Constructions and Stronger Definitions. In: Bernstein D.J., Lange T. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2010. AFRICACRYPT 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6055. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

Public-key encryption schemes with non-interactive opening (PKENO) allow a receiver to non-interactively convince third parties that a ciphertext decrypts to a given plaintext or, alternatively, that such a ciphertext is invalid. Two practical generic constructions for PKENO have been proposed so far, starting from either identity-based encryption or public-key encryption with witness-recovering decryption (PKEWR). We show that the known transformation from PKEWR to PKENO fails to provide chosen-ciphertext security; only the transformation from identity-based encryption remains thus valid. Next, we prove that PKENO can alternatively be built out of robust non-interactive threshold public-key cryptosystems, a primitive that differs from identity-based encryption. Using the new transformation, we construct two efficient PKENO schemes: one based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (in the Random-Oracle Model) and one based on the Decisional Linear assumption (in the standard model). Last but not least, we propose new applications of PKENO in protocol design. Motivated by these applications, we reconsider proof soundness for PKENO and put forward new definitions that are stronger than those considered so far. We give a taxonomy of all definitions and demonstrate them to be satisfiable.

Keywords

public-key encryption non-interactive proofs security definitions constructions 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Galindo
    • 1
  • Benoît Libert
    • 2
  • Marc Fischlin
    • 3
  • Georg Fuchsbauer
    • 4
  • Anja Lehmann
    • 3
  • Mark Manulis
    • 3
  • Dominique Schröder
    • 3
  1. 1.University of Luxembourg 
  2. 2.Université catholique de Louvain, Crypto GroupBelgium
  3. 3.TU Darmstadt & CASEDGermany
  4. 4.LIENS - CNRS - INRIAÉcole normale supérieureParisFrance

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