Abstract
We consider the problem of detecting covert channels within security-enforcing object-capability patterns. Traditional formalisms for reasoning about the security properties of object-capability patterns require one to be aware, a priori, of all possible mechanisms for covert information flow that might be present within a pattern, in order to detect covert channels within it. We show how the CSP process algebra, and its model-checker FDR, can be applied to overcome this limitation.
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Murray, T., Lowe, G. (2010). Analysing the Information Flow Properties of Object-Capability Patterns. In: Degano, P., Guttman, J.D. (eds) Formal Aspects in Security and Trust. FAST 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5983. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12459-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12459-4_7
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