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Trusted Multiplexing of Cryptographic Protocols

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Book cover Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (FAST 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5983))

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Abstract

We present an analysis that determines when it is possible to multiplex a pair of cryptographic protocols. We present a transformation that improves the coverage of this analysis on common protocol formulations. We discuss the gap between the merely possible and the pragmatic through an optimization that informs a multiplexer. We also address the security ramifications of trusting external parties for this task and evaluate our work on a large repository of cryptographic protocols. We have verified this work using the Coq proof assistant.

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McCarthy, J., Krishnamurthi, S. (2010). Trusted Multiplexing of Cryptographic Protocols. In: Degano, P., Guttman, J.D. (eds) Formal Aspects in Security and Trust. FAST 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5983. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12459-4_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12459-4_16

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-12458-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-12459-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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