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The Complexity of Synchronous Notions of Information Flow Security

  • Franck Cassez
  • Ron van der Meyden
  • Chenyi Zhang
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6014)

Abstract

The paper considers the complexity of verifying that a finite state system satisfies a number of definitions of information flow security. The systems model considered is one in which agents operate synchronously with awareness of the global clock. This enables timing based attacks to be captured, whereas previous work on this topic has dealt primarily with asynchronous systems. Versions of the notions of nondeducibility on inputs, nondeducibility on strategies, and an unwinding based notion are formulated for this model. All three notions are shown to be decidable, and their computational complexity is characterised.

Keywords

Security Policy Security Property Winning Strategy Trojan Horse Covert Channel 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Franck Cassez
    • 1
  • Ron van der Meyden
    • 2
  • Chenyi Zhang
    • 3
  1. 1.National ICT Australia & CNRSSydneyAustralia
  2. 2.University of New South WalesSydneyAustralia
  3. 3.University of LuxembourgLuxembourg

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