Abstract
Anonymous credentials are widely used to certify properties of a credential owner or to support the owner to demand valuable services, while hiding the user’s identity at the same time. A credential system (a.k.a. pseudonym system) usually consists of multiple interactive procedures between users and organizations, including generating pseudonyms, issuing credentials and verifying credentials, which are required to meet various security properties. We propose a general symbolic model (based on the applied pi calculus) for anonymous credential systems and give formal definitions of a few important security properties, including pseudonym and credential unforgeability, credential safety, pseudonym untraceability. We specialize the general formalization and apply it to the verification of a concrete anonymous credential system proposed by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya. The analysis is done automatically with the tool ProVerif and several security properties have been verified.
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Li, X., Zhang, Y., Deng, Y. (2009). Verifying Anonymous Credential Systems in Applied Pi Calculus. In: Garay, J.A., Miyaji, A., Otsuka, A. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5888. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10433-6_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10433-6_14
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