Cache-Timing Template Attacks

  • Billy Bob Brumley
  • Risto M. Hakala
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-10366-7_39

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5912)
Cite this paper as:
Brumley B.B., Hakala R.M. (2009) Cache-Timing Template Attacks. In: Matsui M. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2009. ASIACRYPT 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5912. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

Cache-timing attacks are a serious threat to security-critical software. We show that the combination of vector quantization and hidden Markov model cryptanalysis is a powerful tool for automated analysis of cache-timing data; it can be used to recover critical algorithm state such as key material. We demonstrate its effectiveness by running an attack on the elliptic curve portion of OpenSSL (0.9.8k and under). This involves automated lattice attacks leading to key recovery within hours. We carry out the attack on live cache-timing data without simulating the side channel, showing these attacks are practical and realistic.

Keywords

cache-timing attacks side channel attacks elliptic curve cryptography 

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Billy Bob Brumley
    • 1
  • Risto M. Hakala
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Information and Computer ScienceHelsinki University of TechnologyFI-02015Finland

Personalised recommendations