Skip to main content

Decision Making in Voting Games: An Insight into Theory and Practice

  • Conference paper
Modeling Decisions for Artificial Intelligence (MDAI 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 5861))

Abstract

The paper introduces basics of a notion of voting game theory and illustrates its application in practice. Examples outlined in the paper show how the theory works in practice of parliamentary institutions. A few simple examples explain the difference between voting weight and voting power and show how important analysis of voting games is in practice. A study of selected decisive systems explains meaning of such notions as winning and blocking coalitions, initiative and preventive power of a player etc.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Algaba, E., et al.: Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games. Mathematical Social Sciences 46, 63–80 (2003)

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  2. Algaba, E., et al.: The distribution of power in the European Constitution. European Journal of Operational Research 176, 1752–1766 (2007)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  3. Banzhaf, J.F.: Weighted voting doesn’t work: A mathematical analysis. Rutgers Law Review 19(2), 317–343 (1965)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Coleman, J.S.: Control of collectives and the power of a collectivity to act. In: Lieberman, B. (ed.) Social Choice, pp. 269–298. Gordon and Breach, New York

    Google Scholar 

  5. Kirsch, W.: On Penrose’s square-root law and beyond, source text

    Google Scholar 

  6. Penrose, L.: The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 109(1), 53–57 (1946)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Scientists for a democratic Europe: Letter to the governments of the EU member states (2007), http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/mathphys/politik/eu/open-letter.htm (retrieved from source)

  8. Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M.: A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System. American Political Science Review 48, 787–792 (1954)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Slomczynski, W., Zyczkowski, K.: Jagiellonian Compromise an alternative voting system for the Council of the European Union, source text

    Google Scholar 

  10. Zyczkowski, K., Slomczynski, W.: Voting in the European Union: the square root system of Penrose and a critical point, arXiv:cond-mat/0405396v2[cond-mat.other] (2004)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Homenda, W. (2009). Decision Making in Voting Games: An Insight into Theory and Practice. In: Torra, V., Narukawa, Y., Inuiguchi, M. (eds) Modeling Decisions for Artificial Intelligence. MDAI 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5861. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04820-3_6

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04820-3_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-04819-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-04820-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics