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Security Analysis of AN.ON’s Payment Scheme

  • Benedikt Westermann
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5838)

Abstract

In recent years several payment schemes have emerged for anonymous communication systems such as AN.ON and Tor.

In this paper we briefly present a payment scheme that is deployed and currently used by AN.ON. The main contribution of this paper is a security analysis of the most important cryptographic protocols involved in the payment process. The analysis of the protocols shows that they contain several weaknesses that need to be addressed to provide a fair service. We show how an attacker can use the weaknesses to surf on other’s credits. Finally, we propose a fix for the protocols in order to withstand the encountered attacks.

Keywords

Security Analysis Authentication Protocol Payment Scheme Message Sequence Chart Payment Process 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Benedikt Westermann
    • 1
  1. 1.Center for Quantifiable Quality of ServiceNorwegian University of Science and TechnologyNorway

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