Abstract
By using differential equations, evolutionary game theory shows that most of the games of competition for resources have equilibrium strategies named Evolutionary Stable. Although this approach can deduce these points, it is not possible to say how or whether a population will reach such equilibrium. We present an evolutionary agent-based model where individuals compete for space using mixed strategies. Agents belong to spatial locations that settle with whom they can interact, but they can freely move to contiguous partitions according to a definition of satisfiability. The simulation results show that, although the agents do not have any knowledge about equilibrium points, the population’s mean strategy always converges to a stable state, close and above to the analytic equilibrium. Moreover, it is reached independently of the initial population.
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de Andrade, P.R., Monteiro, A.M.V., Câmara, G. (2009). Games on Cellular Spaces: An Evolutionary Approach. In: Lopes, L.S., Lau, N., Mariano, P., Rocha, L.M. (eds) Progress in Artificial Intelligence. EPIA 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5816. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04686-5_44
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04686-5_44
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