A Calculus to Detect Guessing Attacks

  • Bogdan Groza
  • Marius Minea
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5735)

Abstract

We present a calculus for detecting guessing attacks, based on oracles that instantiate cryptographic functions. Adversaries can observe oracles, or control them either on-line or off-line. These relations can be established by protocol analysis in the presence of a Dolev-Yao intruder, and the derived guessing rules can be used together with standard intruder deductions. Our rules also handle partial verifiers that fit more than one secret. We show how to derive a known weakness in the Anderson-Lomas protocol, and new vulnerabilities for a known faulty ATM system.

Keywords

Dictionary Attack Oracle Access Probabilistic Meaning Decryption Oracle Encryption Oracle 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bogdan Groza
    • 1
  • Marius Minea
    • 2
  1. 1.Politehnica University of TimişoaraRomania
  2. 2.Institute e-Austria TimişoaraRomania

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