Efficient Conditional Proxy Re-encryption with Chosen-Ciphertext Security

  • Jian Weng
  • Yanjiang Yang
  • Qiang Tang
  • Robert H. Deng
  • Feng Bao
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5735)


Recently, a variant of proxy re-encryption, named conditional proxy re-encryption (C-PRE), has been introduced. Compared with traditional proxy re-encryption, C-PRE enables the delegator to implement fine-grained delegation of decryption rights, and thus is more useful in many applications. In this paper, based on a careful observation on the existing definitions and security notions for C-PRE, we re-formalize more rigorous definition and security notions for C-PRE. We further propose a more efficient C-PRE scheme, and prove its chosen-ciphertext security under the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption in the random oracle model. In addition, we point out that a recent C-PRE scheme fails to achieve the chosen-ciphertext security.


Conditional proxy re-encryption chosen-ciphertext security random oracle 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jian Weng
    • 1
    • 2
  • Yanjiang Yang
    • 3
  • Qiang Tang
    • 4
  • Robert H. Deng
    • 1
  • Feng Bao
    • 3
  1. 1.School of Information SystemsSingapore Management UniversitySingapore
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceJinan UniversityGuangzhouP.R. China
  3. 3.Institute for Infocomm Research (I2R)Singapore
  4. 4.DIES, Faculty of EEMCSUniversity of TwenteThe Netherlands

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