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On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms

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Algorithmic Decision Theory (ADT 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 5783))

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Abstract

We study the problem of fairness design. Specifically, we focus on approximation algorithms for indivisible items with supporting envy-free bundle prices. We present the first polynomial-communication envy-free profit-maximizing combinatorial auctions for general bidders. In this context, envy-free prices can be interpreted as anonymous non-discriminatory prices. Additionally, we study the canonical makespan-minimizing scheduling problem of unrelated machines, in an envy-free manner. For the special case of related machines model we show that tight algorithmic bounds can be achieved.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Social and Information Sciences Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, US, 91106

    Ahuva Mu’alem

Authors
  1. Ahuva Mu’alem
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Pure and Applied Mathematics, University of Padova, Via Trieste 63, 35121, Padova, Italy

    Francesca Rossi

  2. LAMSADE-CNRS, University of Paris Dauphine, Place du Maréchal De Lattre de Tassigny, 75775, Paris Cedex 16, France

    Alexis Tsoukias

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© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Mu’alem, A. (2009). On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms. In: Rossi, F., Tsoukias, A. (eds) Algorithmic Decision Theory. ADT 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5783. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-04427-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-04428-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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