A Complete Conclusion-Based Procedure for Judgment Aggregation

  • Gabriella Pigozzi
  • Marija Slavkovik
  • Leendert van der Torre
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5783)


Judgment aggregation is a formal theory reasoning about how a group of agents can aggregate individual judgments on connected propositions into a collective judgment on the same propositions. Three procedures for successfully aggregating judgments sets are: premise-based procedure, conclusion-based procedure and distance-based merging. The conclusion-based procedure has been little investigated because it provides a way to aggregate the conclusions, but not the premises, thus it outputs an incomplete judgment set. The goal of this paper is to present a conclusion-based procedure outputting complete judgment sets.


Approval Vote Individual Judgment Judgment Aggregation Collective Judgment Merging Operator 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gabriella Pigozzi
    • 1
  • Marija Slavkovik
    • 1
  • Leendert van der Torre
    • 1
  1. 1.Individual and Collective Reasoning, Computer Science and CommunicationUniversity of LuxembourgLuxembourg

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