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Distinguishing Multiplications from Squaring Operations

  • Frederic Amiel
  • Benoit Feix
  • Michael Tunstall
  • Claire Whelan
  • William P. Marnane
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5381)

Abstract

In this paper we present a new approach to attacking a modular exponentiation and scalar multiplication based by distinguishing multiplications from squaring operations using the instantaneous power consumption. Previous approaches have been able to distinguish these operations based on information of the specific implementation of the embedded algorithm or the relationship between specific plaintexts. The proposed attack exploits the expected Hamming weight of the result of the computed operations. We extrapolate our observations and assess the consequences for elliptic curve cryptosystems when unified formulæ for point addition are used.

Keywords

Side channel attacks differential power analysis modular multiplication and exponentiation RSA square and multiply algorithm 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Frederic Amiel
    • 1
  • Benoit Feix
    • 2
  • Michael Tunstall
    • 3
  • Claire Whelan
    • 4
  • William P. Marnane
    • 5
  1. 1.AMESYSCedex 3France
  2. 2.Inside ContactlessCedex 3France
  3. 3.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of Bristol, Merchant Venturers BuildingBristolUnited Kingdom
  4. 4.TDS (Time Data Security) Ltd.DublinIreland
  5. 5.Department of Electrical and Electronic EngineeringUniversity College CorkCorkIreland

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