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Analysis of the Collision Resistance of RadioGatúnUsing Algebraic Techniques

  • Charles Bouillaguet
  • Pierre-Alain Fouque
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5381)

Abstract

In this paper, we present some preliminary results on the security of the RadioGatúnhash function. RadioGatúnhas an internal state of 58 words, and is parameterized by the word size, from one to 64 bits. We mostly study the one-bit version of RadioGatúnsince according to the authors, attacks on this version also affect the reasonably-sized versions. On this toy version, we revisit the claims of the designers and first improve some results. Secondly, given a differential path, we show how to find a message pair colliding more efficiently than the strategy proposed by the authors using algebraic techniques. We experimented this strategy on the one-bit version since we can efficiently find differential path by brute force. Even though the complexity of this collision attack is higher than the general security claim on RadioGatún〈1 〉, it is still less than the birthday paradox on the size of the internal state.

Keywords

Internal State Hash Function Computer Algebra System Compression Function Round Function 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Charles Bouillaguet
    • 1
  • Pierre-Alain Fouque
    • 1
  1. 1.Ecole normale supérieure, CNRS, INRIAFrance

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