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International Conference on E-Voting and Identity

Vote-ID 2009: E-Voting and Identity pp 122–140Cite as

Minimum Disclosure Counting for the Alternative Vote

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5767))

Abstract

Although there is a substantial body of work on preventing bribery and coercion of voters in cryptographic election schemes for plurality electoral systems, there are few attempts to construct such schemes for preferential electoral systems. The problem is preferential systems are prone to bribery and coercion via subtle signature attacks during the counting. We introduce a minimum disclosure counting scheme for the alternative vote preferential system. Minimum disclosure provides protection from signature attacks by revealing only the winning candidate.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computer Science and Engineering, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, 2052, Australia

    Roland Wen & Richard Buckland

Authors
  1. Roland Wen
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  2. Richard Buckland
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg

    Peter Y. A. Ryan

  2. Dept. of Mathematics and Computer Science,, Technical University of Eindhoven, Eindhoven, The Netherlands

    Berry Schoenmakers

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Wen, R., Buckland, R. (2009). Minimum Disclosure Counting for the Alternative Vote. In: Ryan, P.Y.A., Schoenmakers, B. (eds) E-Voting and Identity. Vote-ID 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5767. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04135-8_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04135-8_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-04134-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-04135-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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