Abstract
Although there is a substantial body of work on preventing bribery and coercion of voters in cryptographic election schemes for plurality electoral systems, there are few attempts to construct such schemes for preferential electoral systems. The problem is preferential systems are prone to bribery and coercion via subtle signature attacks during the counting. We introduce a minimum disclosure counting scheme for the alternative vote preferential system. Minimum disclosure provides protection from signature attacks by revealing only the winning candidate.
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Wen, R., Buckland, R. (2009). Minimum Disclosure Counting for the Alternative Vote. In: Ryan, P.Y.A., Schoenmakers, B. (eds) E-Voting and Identity. Vote-ID 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5767. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04135-8_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04135-8_8
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