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Maude-NPA: Cryptographic Protocol Analysis Modulo Equational Properties

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Foundations of Security Analysis and Design V (FOSAD 2009, FOSAD 2007, FOSAD 2008)

Abstract

In this tutorial, we give an overview of the Maude-NRL Protocol Analyzer (Maude-NPA), a tool for the analysis of cryptographic protocols using functions that obey different equational theories. We show the reader how to use Maude-NPA, and how it works, and also give some of the theoretical background behind the tool.

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Escobar, S., Meadows, C., Meseguer, J. (2009). Maude-NPA: Cryptographic Protocol Analysis Modulo Equational Properties. In: Aldini, A., Barthe, G., Gorrieri, R. (eds) Foundations of Security Analysis and Design V. FOSAD FOSAD FOSAD 2009 2007 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5705. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03829-7_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03829-7_1

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