Security Downgrading Policies for Competitive Bidding System

Conference paper
Part of the Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing book series (AINSC, volume 114)

Abstract

There are many information flows from high security level to low security level. Security downgrading policies control information flow and permit information release from a high security level to low security level. In this paper, the security downgrading policies are present. The security downgrading policies supports downgrading in competitive bidding system. Each downgrading step is annotated with some operations when some conditions are satisfied.

Keywords

Competitive bidding system Security downgrading policies Information flow Relaxed noninterference 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceZunyi Normal CollegeZunyiChina

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