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Optimal Licensing Schemes for Quality-Improving Innovation in the Bertrand Market

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Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineering: Theory and Practice

Part of the book series: Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing ((AINSC,volume 114))

Abstract

Based on the model of Bertrand duopoly, this article considered one of the enterprises was the innovator of a quality-improving technology and analyzed the optimal licensing strategy of the innovator. The main conclusions of our research are as follows: the inventor will not license its technology in the way of a fixed- fee licensing; When it choose a royalty licensing, if the innovation is small, it would license, otherwise it will not; When the difference of the product quality is large, the inventor also will license in the royalty licensing way.

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Yan, Q., Xu, S., Liufan, Zhu, L. (2012). Optimal Licensing Schemes for Quality-Improving Innovation in the Bertrand Market. In: Wu, Y. (eds) Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineering: Theory and Practice. Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing, vol 114. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03718-4_58

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03718-4_58

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-03717-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-03718-4

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