Scada Malware, a Proof of Concept

  • Andrea Carcano
  • Igor Nai Fovino
  • Marcelo Masera
  • Alberto Trombetta
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03552-4_19

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5508)
Cite this paper as:
Carcano A., Fovino I.N., Masera M., Trombetta A. (2009) Scada Malware, a Proof of Concept. In: Setola R., Geretshuber S. (eds) Critical Information Infrastructure Security. CRITIS 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5508. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

Critical Infrastructures are nowadays exposed to new kind of threats. The cause of such threats is related to the large number of new vulnerabilities and architectural weaknesses introduced by the extensive use of ICT and Network technologies into such complex critical systems. Of particular interest are the set of vulnerabilities related to the class of communication protocols normally known as “SCADA” protocols, under which fall all the communication protocols used to remotely control the RTU devices of an industrial system. In this paper we present a proof of concept of the potential effects of a set of computer malware specifically designed and created in order to impact, by taking advantage of some vulnerabilities of the ModBUS protocol, on a typical Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system.

Keywords

Security SCADA Systems Critical infrastructures Malware 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrea Carcano
    • 1
  • Igor Nai Fovino
    • 1
  • Marcelo Masera
    • 1
  • Alberto Trombetta
    • 2
  1. 1.Institute for the Protection and the Security of the CitizenJoint Research Centre, European CommissionIspraItaly
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of InsubriaVareseItaly

Personalised recommendations